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Abstract 
This paper considers the experience New Zealand has made with the CIR Act 
as a form of direct democracy within the last 11 years. The Act has led to a 
number of proposals and three citizen initiated referenda. This paper addresses 
three issues of the CIR act with respect to its intention. One of the goals of the 
CIR Act was to enhance public participation in the democratic process. The 
issues addressed are subject limitations, problems of a referendum question 
and the indicative nature of the Act. The New Zealand experience shows a 
dominant interest of the people to participate in constitutional matters. The 
importance of these issues, demonstrated by other jurisdictions with forms of 
direct democracy and the suggested effect of governmental non-compliance 
with referenda results argue for the development of the CIR Act into a binding 
model. The gain of legitimacy by participation has to be paid for by the flaws 
of the referendum process. The question enables only to give a single answer 
to a usually complex nature of an issue. In the absence of further safeguards, 
which are found in other, all federal jurisdictions, a precaution New Zealand 
should take is found in the use of the benefits of a representative system. 
Intermediate decisions should be made by the elected representatives. The 
benefit of a binding referendum on constitutional matters has to be achieved 
by accepting a restriction to government initiated referendum on such issues . 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The topic of this paper is the New Zealand form of direct democracy . 
The Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 provides for citizens initiated 
indicative referenda. 1 In this paper an attempt will be made to illustrate the 
relationship of direct democracy vs representative government, define the 
relevant terms, place the CIR Act into this relationship and evaluate 
controversial issues with the experience New Zealand made in the last 11 
years of the CIR Act's existence. As far as relevant, the issues shall be 
compared with other jurisdictions. 
It is the thesis of this paper that the New Zealand experience with its 
form of direct democracy advocates a further step to enhance its direct 
democracy elements. This step is believed to be the introduction of a statute 
providing for binding, mandatory veto referenda on fundamental 
constitutional issues. The CIR Act has proved successful in introducing a 
citizens initiated participatory element into New Zealand's legal system. But 
the current statute does not allow for further progress. Thus, if the gained 
advantages of the Act shall be kept, a further development is suggested. 
The first part of the paper provides the framework a referendum needs 
to be seen in. Further, an attempt to illustrate and describe a referendum in 
general is made. The procedure of the Act and a brief introduction to the 
situation in other jurisdictions will be presented. The second part focuses on 
three controversial issues of the CIR Act: Subject limitation, the question and 
the indicative nature. An attempt will be made to evaluate these issues on the 
experience to this point. The evaluation will be made in respect to the 
intended goal of enhancing participation. 
II THE REFERENDUM 
A D~finition 
A referendum (plural: referendums or referenda) is a form of direct 
vote in which an entire electorate votes on a particular proposal. 
1 In the following : the CIR Acl. 
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B Referendum in the Context of Direct Democracy 
The term democracy goes back to ancient Athens. Aristotle described 
democracy as:2 
"'A democracy is characterized by the fact that poor and rich people in principle do 
have the same political rights. Neither one nor the other party is sovereign [to the 
other] ... ' (3) ... [E]veryone, who is registered as a [full] citizen may participate in 
holding public offices, but the law is sovereign. (4) As the previous form, but the 
people and not the law is sovereign.' The forth form was the constitution of Athens 
since Perikles." 
The description already reflects what today are considered 
fundamental democratic principles: Equality in right of the individual, 
sovereignty, legitimacy, participation,3 and "the sharing of power to a great or 
lesser extent."4 Direct Democracy means that political decisions are made 
directly by the whole body of citizens.5 The democracy is direct, because the 
act of participation directly leads to a decision. The trace of legitimacy 
directly goes back to the source of power to make binding rules. The direct 
connection allows for a more clear expression and unaltered transformation of 
the will of all into the exercise of power.6 
2 Aristotle The Politica, Book IV - VI (Corpus Ari stotelicum, 1289 b 33 - 1293 b 39); 
translation taken from: lnge mar Duering Aristoteles - Darstell11ng w1d !nterpretatioin seines 
Denkens (Carl Winter Universitaetsverlag, Heidelberg 1966) 50 I. "'Eine Demokratie wird 
dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass Anne und Reiche im Prinzip dieselben politischen Rechle 
haben, und dass weder die einen noch die anderen die Souveraenitael besitzen. Dies isl die 
beste Form. Es gibt aber Varianten: ( l) Zur Teilnahme an den Aemtern ist eine bestimmte 
Belegung mit Abgaben erforderlich, jedoch nur eine geringe. (2) Alie Buerger von untadli ger 
Geburt haben an den Aemtern teil, aber das Gesetz ist souveraen . (3) Die Abstammung wird 
nicht beruecksichtigt, sondern jeder, der als Buerger eingeschrieben ist, hat an den Aemtern 
teil, aber das Gesetz isl souveraen. (4) Wie die vorige Form, aber das Volk und nicht das 
Gesetz ist souveraen." Die vierte Form war se it Perikles die Verfassung Athens. Durch 
Volksbeschluss wurde alles von Fall zu Fall entschieden." 
3 Nelson Lund "Rousseau and Direct Democracy (with a Note on the Supreme Court's Term 
Limits Decision)" (2004) 13 University of San Diego School of Law Journal of 
Contemporary Legal Issues 459; see a lso: Albert Weale Democracy (St. Marlin ' Press, New 
York, 1999) 16, 78, 167. 
4 Keith Jackson " How shou ld Parliament be changed?" in Colin James (ed) Building the 
Constitution (Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 2000) 343. 
5 Weale above n 3, 24. 
6 Sherman J Clark "A Populi st Critique of Direct Democracy" ( 1998) 112 Harvard Law 
Review 434. 
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The contrary concept is ' representative democracy '. The line be tween 
the people and the exercise of power is interrupted by representative 
institutions. The expression of the will of the people is channelled into the 
ways of representative process. "Parliament is the centrepiece of the 
democratic process ."7 A smaller number of people represent the whole. They 
execute the functions the sum of the people would not efficiently be able to 
handle due the sheer number of participants. A few are elected to make 
decisions for the whole8 and in the interests of the whole.9 
C Analysis of a Referendum Situation 
For the purpose of description and explanation of the functions , 
mechanisms, and effects of a referendum, the following distinction is made: a 
referendum is separated into subjects and relationships. The subjects, or 
elements, are looked at according to their input or output of the situation. This 
includes aspects of what an element does or what is happe ning to it. Why a 
certain action has a certain outcome or what interconnect ions between 
elements exist is the content of the relationships. 
1 Elements of a referendum 
Elements of a referendum are the people on the one side and a n 
individual, single dec ision on the other side. The people are the actors. The 
referendum result is the objective outcome of the action. The refere ndum 
serves as a link to both elements. It is a channel (relationship) and connection 
(element) between them at the same time. It is a channel in as much it 
provides for a method of establishing an interconnec tion between the people 
and a certain decision. The interconnection allows participation and operates 
b · 10 y vot111g. 
7 Jackson, above n 4, 343. 
8 Helena Catt "Citi zens' Initiated Referenda" in Raymond Miller (ed) New Zealand 
Government and Politics (Oxford universit y Press, Auckland, 200 1) 14. 
9 WIKIP ED IA The Free Encyclopedia "Representative Democracy"< 
http://en.wikipedia.org> (las t accessed 04 December 2004). 
1° C lark, above n 10, 440, -+42. 
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2 Characterisation of referenda 
Referenda are described according to who has the authority to initiate 
them: Referenda can be required by a constitution or statute. 11 In most cases, a 
constitution states that for example constitutional amendments have to be put 
to the voters. 12 
In this paper referenda required by law on specified issues are referred 
to as 'mandatory' referenda. Referenda about specified issues, which are to be 
held if the people show desire by initiation of a petition are referred to as 
'optional' referenda. Referenda can be government initiated. This means a 
Government decides by a non-legal motivation to hold a referendum. A third 
form is the referendum initiated by the people. A person or a group of people 
files a petition. When the petition fulfils legal requirements (a certain amount 
of signatures) the proposal is put to a ballot. Those referenda are called 
'initiative', 'citizens initiative', 'plebiscite', 'ballot measure' or 'proposition' 
depending on the legislation. 13 
Referenda legislation might restrict the use of referenda for certain 
subjects, such as constitutional or statute matters, or proposals might be 
allowed to address any desirable issue. 
A referendum might be restricted to be held on one issue only or cover 
more than one matter. Mostly voters are given a choice between two options, 
but referenda might also contain three or more options. 14 Another distinction 
is made by the ballot question: A referendum proposal can be fonnulated as a 
'yes' or 'no' question about a problem or as an alternative choice between two 
(or more) drafts, general suggestions, or maybe policy proposals. 
11 David Butler and Austin Ranney (eds) Referendums -A Comparative Study of Practice and 
Theory (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington D.C., 1978) 
23. 
12 See for e~ample; Constitution of Australia, s 128 ( 1 ); Federal Constitution of the Swiss 
Confederation, art 140( 1 ), (2). 
13 Use of other terminology than 'citizens initiated referendum' or 'government initiated 
referendum' should be made with care for different legislations make different use of the 
terms. For example in Canada a citizens initiated referendum is referred to as a 'plebiscite' 
while the same term in Australia is used for government initiated non-binding referenda. 
14 
For example two referendums held in Sweden, in l 957 and l 980, offered voters a choice of 
three options; WIKIPEDIA "Referendum, above n 9. 
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Referenda differ by their procedure to determine the question. The 
question might be determined by the petitioner, the government (or a 
government agency) or a third party. The promotion and education about the 
referendum issue might be the promoters or interest group's responsibility or 
the government might be required by law to provide educational information 
about the issue. 15 
Referenda can be distinguished by the effect they have: they can be 
binding on the government by law. The law can be a supreme constitution or a 
statute enacted for the specific referendum. In the latter case the government 
has the authority to determine the effect. In contrast, a referendum can be 
indicative in nature. Its effect on government derives from non-legal sources 
such as an assumed moral force 16 or strategic planning in consideration of the 
next election. 
3 Relationships in a referendum situation 
A referendum provides for a two-way relationship between the people 
and the decision. The important aspect is the absence of "interference and 
potential distortion of representative institutions." 17 The relationship "gi ve[s] 
citizens a voice on questions of public policy." 18 At the same time the 
elements are connected by a trace of political legitimacy. 19 The trace of 
legitimacy is direct in comparison to the representative system. In the latter 
legitimacy of the individual decision is deviated from the legitimacy the 
representative body got by election. In practise, representative institutions are 
not totally excluded. They perform functions of administration or 
transformation. For example, the government is involved in conducting a 
referendum. It may be involved by drafting a law people vote on.20 But the 
15 This is the case in most Australian States. See for example: Referendums Act 1997 (Qld), s 
10, 11 , 12. 
16 
( 10 March 1992) 522 NZPD 67 I 0, 6717, 6724. 
17 Clark, above n 10, 435. 
18 City of Eastlake v Forest City Enters., Inc. ( 1976) 426 US 668, 673 (SC). 
19 See: Lund, above n 3, 463. 
20 See for example: Constitution of California, art 2, s 5. 
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difference is that those institutions have a less active and less independent role 
when the people decide directly . 
(a) People towards referendum 
The relationship between the people towards a referendum depends on 
whether people are given the authority to initiate referenda (active) or whether 
they are confined to taking part in it by voting (reactive). It is further 
characterised by the promoters influence in the process such as taking part in 
determining the question and/or promoting/funding the referendum. The 
promoter can be included or mainly excluded in the process. The relationship 
is finally influenced by the range of subjects and choices the voter can 
introduce or exercise in a referendum. 
(b) Effect of referenda 
Another relationship exists between referendum and government. It 
illustrates the legally binding or non-binding effect of the referendum. A 
binding referendum forces government into a reactive position. The will of the 
people is given a legal force. This force could lead to an enactment of a law, 21 
or government could be obliged to act accordingly to a proposition .22 The 
referendum may also be indicative in nature only.23 An indicative referendum 
can only claim a moral force. The Government remains in an active rather 
than reactive position. 
D The need for participation in a democracy 
Professor Clark said: "[A] regime is legitimate if people are made to 
follow only those rules to which they have consented."24 Democracy assumes 
that every subject has the same rights as any other subject within a social 
group.25 No one can make rules for anyone else or enforce such rules, thus 
exercising power over another individual. An individual only can make rules 
21 See for example: Constitution of California, art 2, s 8(a). 
22 See for example: Referendum and Plebiscite Act RSS 1991 c R-8.0 I, s 5. 
23 See for example: Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993, Long Title. 
24 Clark, above n 10,434. 
25 Aristotle The Polirica, Book IV - VI (Corpus Aristotelicum, 1289 b 33 - 1293 b 39). 
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for themself. Rules are applicable to the whole of the people. In theory 
everyone must accept those rules as made by him- or herself. Everyone must 
consent to them. The existence of ongoing consent is legitimacy. 26 
In a pluralistic society unanimous consent is not possible. Legitimacy 
of decisions effecting the whole, the will of the majority must prevail over the 
will of the minority .27 In theory, lack of consent is made up for by giving 
everyone an opportunity to equally participate in making of rules.28 The right 
to make rules is subject to agreed restrictions such as law must be made by the 
correct body in the correct manner. 29 The correct body is an elected 
parliament. Only on the fulfilment of all requirements can a law be said to 
have a right "to demand obedience", another words: can claim legitimacy.30 
Participation is a central element of legitimacy. 
In a representative system, not the vote for the winning party that 
carries consent, but the participation in the election itself. Taking part is an 
expression of approval. Approval is the important feature that carries 
legitimacy. "The essence of democracy is participation."31 
1 Participation in a representative government 
In New Zealand the degree of participation has been of concern. 
Representative government encounters an increasingly complex world and a 
political arena dominated by parties. This has led to a growing feeling among 
voters of disenfranchisement, scepticism and distrust of governmental 
institutions. 32 According to a poll, the support for Parliament in New Zealand 
26 Clark, above n 10, 442. 
27 See: Aristotle The Politico, Book IV - VI (Corpus Aristotelicum, 1293 a 1- 11); Alexis de 
Tocqueville Democracy in America ( 1850) (J P Mayer ed & George Lawrence trans, Harper 
Collins 1988) 246; Geoffrey de Q Walker Initiative and Referendum: The People 's Law (The 
Centre for Independent Studies, St. Leonards, NSW, 1987) S land 82; Clark, above n IO, 447. 28 Clark, above n 10, 442. 
29 H LA Hart The Concept of Law (2nd ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, I 994) 60, 61. 
30 Hart, above n 29, 58, 59. 
31 Jackson, above n 4, 343. 
32 Hon M McCully MP (10 March 1992) 522 NZPD 6709; Hon DAM Graham MP (14 
September I 993) 538 NZPD l 7963; see also: Geoffrey Palmer New Zealand's Constitution in 
Crisis (John Mcindoe Ltd., Dunedin, 1992) 2; Caroline Morris "Ci tizens Referenda: Time to 
Review?" [2002) ZLJ 44. 
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has declined from 33 per cent in 1975 to 14 per cent in 1981, 8 per cent in 
1987 to 4 per cent in 1989.33 In 2000, politicians were placed last on a list of 
23 trusted professions.34 The development is believed to originate in the limits 
of influence representative government allows voters. Voters experience a 
growing distinction between what they vote for and the actual outcome of 
their votes. An example is the 1984 Labour Government stepped away from 
the "mandate theory". 35 The mandate theory said that by voting for a certain 
government, electors gave a mandate to implement a set of policies. 
Previously, a mandate was based on an election manifesto, gave justification 
for actions implementing the policies and by referring to the policies 
mentioned m the manifesto imposed a constitutional restraint on 
Government.36 In 1987 Labour's election manifesto stated that New Zealand 
Post, Postbank and Telecom "will remain in public ownership ... "37 Later on 
they were sold to private owners. 
In 1990 National ' s election manifesto stated that under its governance 
a tax surcharge imposed by the previous government will be removed. 
National was elected but the removal did not take place. Instead, contrary to 
statements in the same manifesto, government took steps to abolish Area 
Health Boards and cut the Health budget.38 
2 The attempt to increase participation by direct democracy 
· · 39 The concerns have led to a plea for a response to this s1tuat1on. 
Growing disrespect for public institutions is considered a reason for disrespect 
for law. This is considered "detrimental to the rule of law". The rule of law 
33 P A Joseph Consriwtional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2nd ed, Brookers, 
Wellington 200 l) 32 l. 
34 Joseph, above n 33, 321. 
35 Joseph, above n 33, 320; J L Caldwell "Election Manifesto Promises: The Law and 
Politics" [ I 989] JZU 108. 
36 Joseph, above n 33, 500. 
37 Palmer, above n 32, 10. 
38 Palmer, above n 32, I 0. 
39 Hon Doug Graham (14 September 1993) 538 NZPD 17963; Morris, above n 32, 44. 
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doctrine is a basic assumption m a legal structure. Disrespect for law 
ultimately is detrimental to democracy.40 
An adequate response is to improve the forms of participation. On the 
assumption "the more direct, the better", improvement is achieved by adding 
forms of participation. For this purpose citizens initiated referenda are 
considered a way to assuage voter feelings. 41 People are given an additional 
and direct opportunity to place subjects on the political agenda that are, in 
their opinion, not adequately discussed42 or exert direct influence in issues 
that are important to them. 43 Referenda increase the acceptance of a political 
system, because a law originating from a referendum is more clearly and 
directly derived from the people's will.44 This is seen as a prominent factor to 
enhance public participation.45 
E The Referendum under the CIR Act in New Zealand 
The CIR Act was enacted by the New Zealand Parliament in 1993. It 
was intended as a suitable fonn of direct democracy and as an attempt to 
promote public participation.46 
1 History of the Act 
The Act is the current result of an ongoing direct democracy debate 
that began with the introduction of the Referendum Bill in 1893, opting for a 
non-binding government controlled referendum. 47 The debate over the Bill 
40 Walker, above n 27, 51. 
41 See: Penelope Brook Cowen, Tyler Cowen, Alexander Tabarrok "An Analysis of Proposals 
for Constitutional Changes in New Zealand" prepared for the New Zealand Business 
Roundtable September 1992 para 6.1.; <http://www.nzbr.org.nz> (last accessed 04 December 
2004). 
42 Ben Goschik " You're the Voice -Try and Understand it: Some Practical Problems of the 
Citizens Initiated Referenda Act" (2003) 34 VUWLR 700. 
43 Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System (Government Print, Wellington, 
1986) 172. 
44 Clark, above n 10,434; Walker, above n 27, 50. 
45 Morris, above n 32, 44. 
46 R Anderson MP ( I O March 1992) 522 NZPD 6717; Hon M McCully MP ( I O March 1992) 
522 NZPD 671 O; Hon D A M Graham MP ( 14 September 1993) 238 NZPD 17963. 
47 (2 August 1893) 80 ZPD 358. 
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ended without result in 1906. 48 Promises to establish means of citizens 
initiative and referendum entered the Labour Party's manifesto in 1911 and 
the Social Democratic Party in 1913.49 The Popular Initiative and Referendum 
Bill was introduced twice, 1918 and 1919.so It contained an indirect initiative 
systems,, but went nowhere. The next proposal for a form of direct democracy 
was incorporated into a proposed written constitution by the Constitutional 
Society for the Promotion of Economic Freedom and Justice in New Zealand 
Incorporated.s2 It did not pass the Public Petitions Committee.s3 In 1975 the 
later called New Zealand Democratic Party included a call for (government 
controlled) referendums in its election manifesto.s4 In 1983 they attempted to 
introduce the Popular Initiatives Bill but failed_ss It would have introduced a 
non-binding citizens initiated referendum system. It finally was introduced a 
year later, 56 and was ruled out by the Speaker of the House a year after. 57 
Brought to the attention of the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform, in its 
1986 report it concluded that "there should be no provision for public 
petitions to compel referenda".s8 By that time the ongoing debate has gained 
widespread support and in 1990 the National Party decided to include a 
proposal to establish a non-binding citizens initiated referendum mechanism 
in its election manifesto.59 This led to the CIR Act. 
48 (12 September 1906) 136 NZPD 502; Hon DAM Graham MP (14 September 1993) 538 
NZPD 17963. 
49 W McIntyre and W Gardner Speeches and Docwnents on New Zealand History (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1971) 221, 228. 
50 
( 13 April I 918) 182 NZPD 204; (9 September 1919) 184 NZPD 320-328. 
5 1 
( 13 April 1918) 182 NZPD 204 or ( 15 April 1918) vol 182 NZPD 214. 
52 Report of Public Petitions M to Z Committee I 96 l [ l 96 l] AJHR l.2A, 3. 
53 Report of Public Petitions M to Z Committee, above n 52, 3. 
54 See S Levine and A Robinson The New Zealand Voter -A Sun1ey of Public Opi11io11 and 
Electoral Behaviour (Price Mill bum, Wellington, 1976) I 02, I 07. 
55 (9 December 1983) 455 NZPD 4746, 4757. 
56 (6 November 1984) 458 NZPD 1313. 
57 
( I 3 November 1985) 467 ZPD 8069. 
58 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, above n 43, 176, 181. 
59 Mark W. Gobbi The Quest/or Legitimacy: A Compararive Constitutional Swdy of the 
Origin and Role of Direct Democracy in Swit::.erland. Ca/1fornia and New Zealand, (LLM 
Thesi , Victoria University of Wellington, 1994) 256. 
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2 Procedure of the Act 
The CIR Act enables any person to submit a proposal for an indicative 
referendum to the Clerk of the House of Representatives. 60 Within three 
months of the receipt of the petition, the Clerk has to determine the final 
question of the referendum. 61 The Clerk shall take other opinions into 
account62 and must ensure that the question clearly states the purpose and only 
one of two answers may be given to the question.63 Then the petitioner has 12 
months to collect signatures of at least 10 per cent of eligible voters.64 The 
Clerk has two months to determine whether or not the petitioner has been 
successful.65 If the petitioner has been successful, the actual referendum has to 
be held within the next 12 months. 66 
3 The last 11 years 
Since its passing in 1993 a total of 31 proposals have been made to 
hold a referendum. Three of them were put on a ballot. The first referendum 
in New Zealand under the CIR Act was held in 1995. The other two were held 
in combination with the general election in 1999. The New Zealand 
Government has not acted upon any of the three referendum results. 67 
4 Referenda in other Jurisdictions 
The use of referenda as a method to involve the people 111 decision 
making is a common instrument throughout the world. 
(a) Switzerland 
Of the western democracies, Switzerland, having a codified legal 
system, takes the leading role in terms of use of referenda. Provisions about 
60 Citizens Jnitiated Referenda Act, s 6. 
61 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 11 . 
62 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s I 0(2). 
63 Citizens Jnitiated Referenda Act, s 10( I). 
64 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 15(3), 18(2). 
65 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 18(1 ). 
66 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act, s 22AA( I). 
67 Morri s, above n 32, 44, 46. 
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mandatory referenda are incorporated into the Federal Constitution68 and all 
of the 26 state constitutions.69 
(b) United States of America 
The United States is an example of the common law world, where 
referenda legislation can be found in 49 US states. For example, in all those 
states amendments to the federal constitution have to be approved by voters.70 
Initiatives are found in twenty-four states.71 
(c) Canada 
Federal Canada 72 and all but one province 73 have legislation 
concerning the holding of referenda. Eight out of thirteen provinces/territories 
have enacted separate referendum legislation.74 Two provinces have referenda 
provisions incorporated into their electoral statutes 75 and two provinces have 
subject orientated legislation that call for referenda in specific instances 76. 
(d) Australia 
The Constitution of Australia provides for a mandatory referendum in 
case of a change of the constitution. 77 The situation in the Australian states is 
68 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, art 140( 1), (2). 
69 
See: Constitutions of the Cantons of: Aargau, art 62(1); Appenzell Ausser-Rhoden, art 60(1); Appenzell 
Inner-Rhoden, art 7terl 0( I); Basel-Land, art 34 a-e; Basel-City, art 27, 54( l), 55, 56; Berne, art 61( l) a-d; 
Fribourg, art 28(1), (2); Geneve, art 56(1), 68(1); Glarus, art 69( l ); Graubunden, art 16; Jura, art 77; 
Luzern, art 39bis (I); Neuchatel, art 44(1); idwalden, art 52; Obwalden, art l l l,l 12,58(a); Sankt Gallen, 
art 48; Schafn1ausen, art 31; Schwyz, art 30( 1)-(4); Solothurn, art 35( I); Thurgau, art 23( 1 ); Ticino, art 42; 
Uri, art 24; Yalais, art 34(3); Yaud, art 83( I); Zug, art 31 a, 32, 79 (3); Zurich, art 30(28) ( 1)-(4). 
70 Lund, above n 3, 461. 
71 Richard B Collins and Dale Oesterle "Governing by Initiative: Structuring the Ballot 
Initiative: Procedures That Do and Don't Work" (1995) 66 University of Colorado Law 
Review 49. 
72 Referendum Act (Canada) 1992. 
73 Ontario. 
74 
Constitutional Referendum Act RSA 2002 c C-25, Referendum Act RSBC 1996 c 400, 
Recall and initiative Act RSBC 1996 c 398, Plebiscites Act RSPEl 1988 c P-10, Referendum 
Act RSQ 2002 c C-64. l, Referendum and Plebiscite Act RSS 1991 c R-8.0 l, Plebiscite Act 
RSNWT 1988 c.P-8, Plebiscite Act RSNWT (Nunavut) 1988 c.P-8, Plebiscite Act RSY 2002 
c C-l 72. 
75 Elections Act SNL 1991 c E-3. l, s 217; Elections Act SNB 2000 c E-3, s 129( l ). 
76 
Retail Business Uniform Closing Day Act RSNS 2004 c 402. 
77 Constitution of Australia, s 128 ( l ). 
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similar to Canada in regard to the situation in the states compared to the 
federal level: All states/territories have some legislation, specifically dealing 
with referenda. Three states/territories out of eight have enacted separate 
referendum legislation.78 Three states have clauses providing for mandatory 
referenda incorporated into their constitutions. 79 Two states/territory have 
enacted legislation outlining the use of referenda, in case a statute provides 
legal grounds for the holding of a referendum. 80 In the past eleven years 
federal Australia has held two referenda simultaneously in 1999. Since the 
enactment of its constitution in 1900, federal Australia has held 44 referenda 
about constitutional changes, two plebiscites as indicative referenda and one 
poll. The difference between referenda/plebiscite and a poll in Australia 1s 
compulsory voting for the former, optional participation for the latter. 81 
(e) United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom, like New Zealand the only unitary state among 
these considered, has only recently enacted a statute specifically regarding 
referenda. The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act (UK) 2000 
mainly considers financial aspects of the holding of referenda. In general, the 
United Kingdom enacts individual statutes for each referendum.82 
III ISSUES OF THE CIR ACT 
Three controversial aspects of the CIR Act shall be discussed. The aim 
is to evaluate expressed concerns against the experience of the last 11 years in 
respect to participation. Similar experiences fonn other jurisdictions and the 
consequences will be considered as applicable and possible. 
78 Referendums Act 1997 (Qld), Referendums Act 1983 (WA), Referendums Act 200 l ( T). 
79 
Constitution Act 1902 (NSW), s 7 A, Constitution Act 1934 (SA), Constitution Act 1975 
(Vic) , s 18. 
80 Referendum Procedures Act 1994 (Tas), Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1994 
(ACT). 
81 The Australian Electoral Commission The Australian Referendums 1906 - 1999 CD-Rom; 
for further information , see: <www.ace.gov.au> (last accessed 15 December 2004). 
82 For example: Referendums (Scotland and Wales) Act 1997 (UK), Greater London 
Authority (Referendum) Act 1998 (UK), Regional Assembly (Preparation ) Act 2004 (UK). 
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The first point of interest is the range of subjects the CIR Act allows to 
be addressed. It will be asked whether the range of possible issues has an 
influence on participation. A second point of interest is connected with the 
referendum question. It is asked how it influences the evaluation of public 
participation. The third point of interest focuses on the relationship between 
referendum and government under the CIR Act and whether this relationship 
is beneficiary or detrimental to its purpose. 
A The Range of Participation: Subject Limitations 
The purpose of the CIR Act is to "indicate the views held by the 
people". 83 The following paragraphs address the past proposals and referenda, 
and whether this can be regarded as an expression of the views of the people. 
First the proposals and referenda are introduced. Then problems of direct 
democracy influenced interpretation of the 'views of the people' with respect 
to participation will be looked at. 
1 Possible subjects according to the CIR Act 
New Zealand citizens can initiate referenda on any subject. Clause 3 of 
the Act states that "[a] petition seeking the holding of [a] . . . referendum may 
... be presented to the House of Representatives". The CIR Act does not 
contain limitations concerning the range or topic of the subject for a 
referendum. The only limitation is found in clause 4 and provides that " [a] ... 
petition shall not relate to a matter that is or could be or could have been 
subject of an election petition under Part 8 of the Electoral Act 1993 or of an 
application under this Act." 
2 Subjects of previous proposals 
Of 31 proposals submitted to the Clerk of the House, eleven have 
touched on various constitutional matters (judicial power of judges; 84 
83 Citizens Initia ted Referenda Act l 993, long title. 
84 Notice 2784 ( 14 April 1994) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 1330. 
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constitutional enforceability of political accountability; 85 number of MP's 
(two proposals); 86 national constitution/effect of the Treaty of Waitangi ; 87 
democracy by referendum;88 referendum to change the voting system (three 
1 ) 89 . . . 90 d b" d" f f d 9 1) proposa s ; wntten const1tut10n ; an m mg nature o re eren a . 
Seven proposals were concerned with political issues which would 
have influenced the nature of the political system (free public health ;92 free 
education; 93 government goal of full employment; 94 benefit; 95 reduction of 
military budget and alternative spending; 96 and request to government to 
reduce unemployment 97 ). All six proposals along with one concerning 
sustainable energy and energy conservation 98 would have had a significant 
impact on the financial situation and Governments freedom on spending. 
Six proposals were concerned with justice and legal issues (equality 
before the law;99 reform of the justice system; 100 Parenting Bill and Family 
C I OI 1 f p . . R f A I 02 1 h p . C · 1 I 03 ourt; repea o rost1tut1on e orm et ; appea to t e nvy ounc1 ; 
and administration - criteria for school closures 104) . 
85 Notice 6484 ( 1 September 1994) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 2686. 
86 Notice 4045 (02 June 1994) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 1843 and noti ce 4296 (26 
June 1997) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 1500. 
87 Notice 1725 (20 March 1997) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 642. 
88 Noti ce 4828 (08 Jul y 1999) New Zealand Ga::.ette Wellington 1884, 
89 Notice 791 8 (02 November 2000) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 3858, notice 180 (11 
January 200 l) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 60, and noti ce 3469 (2 1 May l 998) New 
Zealand Ga::.ette Wellington 1580. 
90 Notice 5509 (09 August 2001 ) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 2157. 
91 Noti ce 1026 (13 February 2003) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 332. 
92 Notice 8893 (08 December 1994) New Zealand Ga::.ette Wellington 4335. 
93 Noti ce 8893 (08 December 1994) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 4335. 
9
• Noti ce 8893 (08 December 1994) New Zealand Gazeue Wellington 4335. 
95 Noti ce 8893 (08 December 1994) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 4335. 
96 Noti ce 8893 (08 December 1994) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 4335. 
97 otice 3404 ( 13 May 1999) New Zealand Ga::.ette Wellington 1289. 
98 Notice 8893 (08 December I 994) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 4335. 
99 Notice 3 14 ( 12 January 1995) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 52. 
100 Noti ce 7159 (09 October 1997) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 3423. 
10 1 oti ce 3757 (25 May 2000) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 1207. 
102 Noti ce 5853 (04 Septe mber 2003) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 3392. 
103 Noti ce 2404 ( LO April 2003) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 947. 
10
• otice 2 151 (25 March I 999) New Zealand Gazeue Wellington 889. 
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Three proposals dealt with issues largely of industrial nature (number 
of firefighters; 105 preservation of national forests 106 and public ownership of 
forest industry 10\ 
Two proposal regarded health issues (increase of health budget; 108 and 
ban on tobacco products' 09). 
One proposal was intended as an ethical issue (ban on eggs from 
battery hens 11 °). The one currently pending proposal concerns the design of 
the flag of New Zealand. 111 
3 Indications drawn from subject topics and numbers 
As a reference group for the people's views, these figures lack the 
popular vote on them. The evaluative value is limited, because the figures are 
from proposals only. In regard to the opportunity provided by the CIR Act 
they however do indicate the range of topics of interest to the people. In 
respect to the time of existence of the CIR Act these numbers also are able to 
make a statement about the appreciation this form of direct democracy has 
received in New Zealand so far. 
The numbers indicate that constitutional matters in form of the precise 
structure of the current government system seem to have been of foremost 
concern with more than one third (35.5 per cent) of all proposals. Second in 
importance appears to be the abstract structure of the state in terms of how the 
political system should be shaped. However, the first five of those six 
proposals together with the sustainable energy proposal were all submitted by 
the Next Step Democracy Movement at the same time, while the ten 
constitutional proposals came from different promoters. The former six 
105 Notice 8312 ( 17 November 1994) New Zealand Gazeue Wellington 3559. 
106 Notice 4932 (0 I August 1996) New Zealand Gaz.e1te Wellington 2013. 
107 Notice 2524 (18 April 1996) New Zealand Ga::.eue Wellington 1048. 
108 Notice 7411 ( 16 October 1997) New Zealand Ga::.e1te Wellington 35 12. 
109 Notice 2422 (06 April 2000) New Zealand Ga::.ette Wellington 792. 
110 Notice 976 ( I O February 1994) New Zealand Ga::.ette Wellington 7 19. 
111 Notice 4986 (29 July 2004) New Zealand Gaz.e1te Wellington 2320. 
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proposals were withdrawn by the promoter. 112 Those six proposals each dealt 
with the function of government in respect to the classification of a political 
system (Should government be responsible for providing health care or is it 
the responsibility of each individual? Should the individual has to take care of 
his or her education or shall government provide for it? Is Government 
deciding how to use resources or does the individual has to make his or her 
choice according to the options on the market?). They had in common that 
their enactment would have imposed a major change in the perception of the 
state. They would have lead to a change in the political system. 
Based on this commonality and the fact that they originate from one 
promoter they can be regarded as one proposal. Then the number of proposals 
concerning constitutional issues gives a stronger statement for the importance 
of constitutional issues. The percentage rises to 42.3 per cent. Next in 
importance are now matters of judicial and legal nature: 23 per cent (or 19.4 
per cent without the 'promoter' reduction). They are similar to constitutional 
matters, because they touch on the relationship of the citizen vs state, however 
they are less abstract than constitutional matters. They deal with more specific 
and practicable administration of rules. Both groups are concerned with 
elements of the exercise of power. 
Seven proposals, somewhat more than a quarter (26.9 per cent) of all 
proposals submitted (22.6 per cent without reduction) , regard four other topics 
which all of them have in common that they are, in contrast to the above 
mentioned issues, elements of distributive administration. The remaining six 
proposals mount up to 15.3 per cent (or 12.9 per cent without reduction) . 
The figures show citizen's interest in various subjects and desire to 
bring their issues to the political agenda, if given the opportunity. In terms of 
a chance to promote one's own issues the lack of subject limitations appears 
to be a benefit. The figures also seem to illustrate that the issues people 
primarily want to have direct influence on, are constitutional issues. 
112 Notice 7007 (22 September 1994) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 2919. 
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The overall number of 31 proposals amounts to an average of almost 3 
proposals per year. In comparison, in California, which sometimes is called 
the "centre of direct democracy today" 113 in the period from 1991 to 2000 a 
total of 389 proposals were filed. 114 Given a population of New Zealand of 
about 4.061.300 (estimate in June 2004)1 15 and of California of about 
35.934.000 (estimate June 2003) 116 in roughly the same time period the capital 
of direct democracy had one proposal per 92.300 inhabitants while New 
Zealand had one proposal per 131.000 inhabitants. The figures show that the 
existence of the citizens initiated referenda Act is recognised as an 
opportunity to put one's own issue on a more public agenda and that the 
existence of a form of direct democracy is appreciated in the New Zealand 
system of government. 
4 Subjects of referenda 
Three referenda have been held: on an industrial dispute (firefighter 
referendum), a criminal issue (reform of the justice system and treatment of 
offenders referendum) and a constitutional matter (members of Parliament 
referendum). 117 These numbers show a success rate for proposals of about 10 
per cent. In comparison, the overall figure for proposals which made it to the 
ballot in California is 26 per cent. 118 
Three referenda are relatively small in number to draw further 
conclusions from. The referenda topics seem to suggest the assumption about 
113 Gail Heriot "Symposium on Direct Democracy: Introduction (2004) 13 University of San 
Diego School of Law Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 313. 
114 Initiative and Referendum Institute "A Brief History of the Initiative and Referendum 
Process in the United States <www.iandrinstitute.org> (last accessed 08 December 2004). 
115 Statistics New Zealand, Top 20 statistics, estimated resident population, 
<http://www.stats.govt.nz> (last accessed 24 September 2004). 
116 USGS Science for a Changing World, Status and Trend of the ations Biological 
Resources, Part 2 Regional Trends in Biological Resources - California 
<http://biology.usgs.gov> (last accessed 22 September 2004). 
117 Benjamin Goschzik You 're the Voice - try and Undersrand it: Some Practical Problems of 
the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act (LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 
2002) 50, appendix l. 
118 This number accounts for the entire period of existence of initiatives in California. See: 
Initiative and Referendum Institute, above n 114. 
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constitutional matters drawn form the proposals is incorrect. In the referenda 
issues concerning constitutional matters were less represented compared to 
their appearance in the proposals. But experience from the states of the US, 
where most of the initiative states allow referenda to enact statutes or amend 
the constitution, 119 indicate otherwise. For example in Oregon twenty-six of a 
total of thirty measures initiated by the people since 1984 concerned 
. . I 120 Th f const1tut10na matters. ere ore, oversees experience supports the 
conclusion drawn from proposals: as best as a initiative process is able to 
indicate, the foremost concern, the people want to take direct action in, are 
constitutional matters. 
5 The voice of the people 
Regarding the purpose of "indicat[ing] the views held by the 
people" 121 the question following the figures is whether a result is able to 
indicate the views of the people. The term 'views' need to be defined. 
6 The meaning of 'views' of the people 
In the United States the direct democracy argumentation is able to 
address a definition of the views of the people from a basis of popular 
· 12" Th U . d S C ' [ ] d sovereignty. - e rnte tates Supreme ourt explained: ' u n er our 
constitutional assumptions, all power derives from the people, who can 
delegate it to representative instruments which they create .... [T]he people 
can reserve to themselves power ... " 123 
With respect to the 'statement' of what people want, this paper accepts 
to two basic premises: legitimacy is the existence of ongoing consent. 124 To 
be able to reach decisions affecting the whole, the will of the majority must 
119 Collins, Oesterle, above n 71, 51. 
12° Collins, Oesterle, above n 71, 52. 
121 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993, long title. 
122 Clark, above n 10, 441. 
123 City of Eastlake v Forest City Enters., Inc. (1976) 426 US 668,673 (SC). 
124 Clark, above n 10, 442. 
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prevail over the will of the minority. 125 And consent is maximised by full 
participation. 126 Participation includes at least, but not limited to the power to 
make laws. In a binding referendum, this includes voting on a proposal for a 
law, amendment, or repeal. But exercising power in terms of making policy 
requires more decisions than enacting or not enacting a statute. It includes 
checks for coherence with other laws, checks for efficiency, decisions for 
political directions, and many more. That allows for the statement that in 
societies based on popular sovereignty, every aspect of participation 1s 
important. Participation in a broader sense than just voting can be paraphrased 
as everything that is said in respect to and effect on the exercise of power. As 
a result, 'views' are a statement of the voice of the people speaking about the 
exercise of power. 
In New Zealand the popular sovereignty approach does not necessarily 
hold strong in light of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. 127 The 
differences of the doctrines become relevant regarding the fact that referenda 
in California are binding in nature and referenda in New Zealand are 
indicative in nature . In New Zealand the power to make binding laws is 
reserved to Parliament. It could be argued, then, that the relevant 'views' of 
the people are only those given in response to a government initiated specific 
question. The voice of the people speaks with binding force only when 
granted such authority. This thought might lead to the conclusion, that 
therefore the views indicated in a referendum would not be relevant at all, 
because it is indicative only. In this case, either the long title of the Act, the 
conclusion or both would be absurd. 
The law-making power of Parliament and the enactment of a specific 
statute for citizens initiated referenda could also be interpreted as defining the 
majority decision made on a 'yes' or ' no' alternative as the relevant part in the 
people's views. Relevant for law-making is the 'yes' or 'no' majority 
decision, if Parliament chooses to put a question to the voters. 
125 Clark, above n 10,447. 
126 Clark, above n 10, 442. 
127 Joseph, above n 33, 3. 
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It is assumed in this paper that in the CIR Act the popular sovereignty 
approach is intended. Relevant is more than just the majority statement on two 
alternatives. The long title of the Act not only refers to indicate the views of 
the people but also states that referenda shall be held and that these referenda 
are citizens initiated. It is the voice of the people in all of what they have to 
say that is of interest to the Act. If the interest of the view of the people would 
be limited to one certain response to a specified question, this purpose could 
have been achieved by special legislation addressing an individual topic as it 
is in the United Kingdom. This would be sufficient to capture the desire to 
hear the people and frame it in legal terms. But instead, the long title of the 
Act states that the voice of the people shall have a different weight in the 
aspect of participation. The government as a whole entity gives the people by 
law a means of expressing whatever they feel is important. That is the essence 
of providing for a citizens initiative. 
The combination of the opportunity of initiative and the referral to the 
view of the people reasons that 'v iews' have to be defined as more than a 
'yes/no' response. This interpretation allows for the statement that the 
opportunity for citizens to address any topic and bring it up to a national ballot 
is a valuable method to grant the people to have their say and to make it heard. 
128 The corresponding intention of the Government of New Zealand is 
expressed by the former Minister of Justice in the introduction of the Bill: "[i] t 
is the responsibility of the Government to ensure that to the greatest extent 
possible it is the will of the people that prevails, rather than that of their 
elected representatives. This Bill will help to ensure that that occurs". 129 
7 The priority problem 
When the voice of the people is more than a 'yes/no' to a certain 
question, It's content needs to be determined. Professor Sherman Clark drew 
128 Hon D A M Graham MP ( I O March 1992) 522 NZPD 6703, 6704. 
129 Hon D A M Graham MP ( 10 March 1992) 522 ZPD 6705. 
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attention to what he called the priority problem. 130 In his opinion the question 
is " ... about the full and equal input that is presumed to legitimate ... 
outcomes. The goal is to approximate universal consent, without violating the 
principle of equality that gives rise to the need to secure that consent." 131 
Professor Clark started out from the 'intensity problem'. According to this 
theory " ... for each person, some issues will be more important than will 
others". 132 People have preferences in varying intensity. And "single-issue 
votes cannot take into account" these preferences. 133 He than reasoned that 
preferences are an important part of the voice of the people: in a single 
referendum a majority might vote that X should prevail over not-X. In another 
referendum Y is voted for, in a third Z is voted for. "This does not mean, 
however, that the overall outcome XYZ is most preferred by the people as a 
whole, or that XYZ would necessarily command a majority." 134 Professor 
Clark argues that "what is needed is a method of allowing people ... which 
outcomes they want most." 135 
8 Criticism 
Criticism to the priority problem stated that is was not explained, why 
the ability to express and include preferences in the voice of the people is of 
such importance. 136 On the contrary, the priority problem theory would have 
to explain why "the process of obtaining a constitutional amendment in forty-
nine states is (presumably) legitimate despite the fact that the process in each 
of those states ultimately simply 'counts heads in fom1 of a single-issue 
· · ,,, 137 maJonty vote . 
13° Clark, above n 10, 458. 
131 Clark, above n 10, 453. 
132 Clark, above n 10, 450. 
133 Clark, above n 10, 450. 
134 Clark, above n I 0, 449. 
135 Clark, above n 10, 450. 
136 Lynn A Baker "Preferences, Priorities, and Plebiscites" (2004) 13 University of San Diego 
School of Law Journal of Contemporary Legal Studies 322. 
137 Baker "Preferences, Priorities, and Plebiscites", above n 136, 322. 
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9 Preferences and exclusions 
It is agreed in this paper that preferences are an important part of the 
voice of the people and that the people will want to express them. Further to 
Professor Clark's claim, it is believed that voters will not only want to express 
priorities but also exclusions. Exclusion is understood as a hypothetical 
situation resulting out of a specific decision, which people do not want to 
happen at al I. 
The recognition of preferences and exclusions in the voice of the 
people is of such importance, because of the risk of unexpected consequences 
and the effect on legitimacy. Assuming in theory "a pre-eminent human desire 
for self-preservation ... that ... drives us ... to ... agree[] to the institution of 
political rule" 138 and agreeing "[t]hat government is , or ought to be, instituted 
for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people ... " 139 the 
consent of the people has its limits. In practise these limits are reached when 
unexpected consequences touch upon the core understanding of why people 
want to live together under a political rule. Some of those consequences will 
be excluded from what the people want at all times . In the extreme case a 
referendum about the 'protection of national markets ' might lead to trade 
restrictions, might lead to diplomatic tensions. In another case this might be a 
referendum about the 'protection of national recourses'. It might be happening 
in a region like the Far East. It might concern the supply of water. Such 
tensions have the potential to erupt into war over the necessity of the 
commodity for survival. The result of such war could be that more areas to 
live are devastated than the decrease of water-supply would have done. 
Assuming this happens in a democratic system, in theory a claim could arise: 
"we did not want that!" 
The example does not have to be a war about water. Protection of 
national markets and following trade sanction might lead to a higher 
unemployment rate due to lay offs. The people laid off are likely to rise the 
138 Joh n Locke The Second Treatise on Government (reprint Thomas P Peardon (ed), The 
Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690) para 19; Lund, above n 3,472. 
139 Virginia Declaration of Rights; Lund, above n 3, 464. 
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claim. As a result, unexpected consequences are able to lead to situations, 
which in some stage, at some degree, to some extend the people will want to 
exclude at all cost. When ever this stage might be reached and the claim is 
heard, ongoing consent decreases, thus legitimacy. Depending on the 
seriousness of the consequences, the importance of this claim to the people 
will rise in proportion of the consent decreasing. 
The reason why "the process of obtaining a constitutional amendment 
m forty-nine states" 140 could at least be seen as 'more legitimate' is, that, 
concerning the situation of preferences, there are less preferences to express. 
For one thing, constitutional changes are rarer in numbers. Another thing is 
that constitutional changes are more closely monitored, discussed and 
consequences predicted. The different dealing with fundamental rules also 
functions as a safeguard against the occurrences of unexpected consequences. 
Information are distributed and likely to be gathered by different interest 
groups. "We did not want that" will not be a valid claim, because the answer 
is : "yes, you did. We told you this might happen and you still voted for it." 
10 Summary: interpretation of the voice in New Zealand 
On an abstract level it "is the responsibility of the Government to 
ensure that to the greatest extent possible it is the will of the people that 
prevails ... " and the CIR Act is intended to achieve this. 141 This statement 
taken as a Government expression of how it sees itself in the relationship 
towards the people, it follows that important in the voice is every statement 
that influences the exercise of power, because government is making 
decisions for the whole. The decision is perceived to be followed, thus in this 
actions government is exercising power. 
In terms of the long title of the CIR Act, 'v iews of the people' includes 
aspects that would alter the exercise of power. These are preferences and 
exclusions. The aspects are identical with the methods and procedures of 
140 Baker "Preferences, Priorities, and Plebiscites", above n 136, 322 
141 Hon D A M Graham MP ( I O March 1992) 522 NZPD 6705. 
representative government, because those procedures have the purpose to 
work all the input representative institutions get from the people and the 
representatives inside, through to a final governing decision of the Executive 
or a legal decision of Parliament. This includes for example the preferences 
expressed by Professor Clark. The preferences are equal to political manifesto 
and party policy statements in representative government. It also includes 
opinions about the handling of unexpected consequences of a new law. This 
might equal the function of a court in the interpretation of a statute or a 
parliamentary debate about the effect of a statute. If, hypothetically, a Court in 
New Zealand decides that because of a statute enacted by referendum, a 
former statute is impliedly repealed and this repeal would touch upon 
constitutional principles, the views of the people would include a suggestion 
whether this outcome is desirable, acceptable or by which standards should be 
dealt with it. 
11 Subject limitation and the voice of the people 
A referendum is unable to capture and adequately express the 
complete statement of what the voice of the people expresses. The lack of 
subject limitation is not able to improve the situation. 
Such an assumption remains a hypothesis as long as the CIR Act is 
indicative in nature only. But the indicative nature is not guaranteed. Future 
changes have already been considered at the introduction of the Bill. 142 In case 
of a binding referendum Act, the lack of subject limitations would worsen the 
situation. If an attempt to take all important views into account is not made, 
the referendum result will not adequately reflect of what the people have to 
say. If an attempt will be made the people will be overwhelmed by the 
demand of statements addressed to them. As a practical consequence, people 
will be unable to oversee the complexity of the situation. Complexity makes it 
almost impossible to track all factors the people would consider. If the people 
are able to fully analyse a given proposal in its interconnection to the rest of 
the governing system, it makes it almost impossible to express factors as 
142 Hon D A M Graham MP ( 10 March 1992) 522 NZPD 6703. 
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important to them. A lack of subject limitation allows for this dilemma to 
occur m every topic put on a ballot. A proposal may be on the ballot that 
interferes with structures, mechanisms, or laws in unpredictable areas of 
public life. In case of a binding referendum with no subject limitations, 
safeguards are needed to capture the situation and provide for mechanisms to 
solve such situations. 
12 Subject limitations in other Jurisdictions 
(a) Switzerland 
Subject of the referendum m Switzerland are limited by law and are 
connected to the terms ' initiative' and 'mandatory/optional referendum'. 
Initiatives, as understood as proposed by a certain number of citizens in a 
petition, are limited to total or partial revision of the federal constitution. 143 A 
proposal for partial constitutional revision may be submitted as a general 
suggestion or a formulated draft. 144 In the later case, the Government can 
submit a counterproposal. 145 Alternatively, the Federal Parliament can agree 
to the petition and has to draft the amendments itself. It also might reject the 
proposal in which case the general idea of the proposal goes to a preliminary 
" d 146 1· . . . f . . 1 . . d 147 b reieren um. 111t1at1ves or const1tut10na rev1s1on are man atory, ecause 
once a petition has gathered the necessary signatures the procedure ultimately 
will result in a referendum .148 The referendum is binding. 149 Other mandatory 
referenda, which do not include a popular initiative, have to be held about the 
entry into organizations for collective security or into supra-natural 
communities 150 or about federal declared urgent without a constitutional 
basis151 . In contrast to mandatory referenda, an optional referendum is held 
IH Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, art 138( I), 139(1). 144 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, art 139(2). 
145 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, art 139(5). 
146 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, art 139(4). 
147 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, art 140( l)a. 
148 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, art 140(2) . 
149 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, art 139 (6) argumentum e contrario. 
15° Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, art 140( I). 
151 Federal Constitution of the Swis Confederation, art 140( I) d. 
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when 50.000 people by signature demand a popular vote on federal statutes, 
some federal decrees and certain international treaties. 152 
All 26 Swiss state constitutions provide for popular initiatives. The 
subjects of the initiatives are limited to constitutional amendments, 
introduction, amendment or repeal of state law. Some states provide for intra-
federal or international treaties to be approved or for the opportunity to 
contest governmental decrees. The validity of popular initiatives has to be 
certified by the state government in all of the 26 states. 
Federal Switzerland seems to give its citizens a variety of topics to 
vote on. It actively seems to focus on the citizen's participation by mandatory 
referenda. But of all options only the general suggestion allows for the public 
to bring their issues with their interpretation into the process. Constitutional 
amendments or statute drafts imply subject limitations in a sense that the 
proposal is bound to the topic of the amendable statute. The proposal is 
restricted by additional safeguards: in 1999 Switzerland enacted a revised 
constitution allowing the Federal Parliament to declare an initiative invalid in 
case when it violates mandatory rules of international law, principles of "unity 
of form" or "unity of subject matter". 153 On the other side, the state 
constitutions do not limit the possibilities to address issues within their 
jurisdiction. On state level , voters are restricted in that their proposal has to be 
in form of a law. But the subjects of these laws are not limited by anything 
else than the limits of the Canton's jurisdiction within the federal system. In 
effect, the limitation is a formal one. 
Requirements for drafting, governments ability to submit 
counterproposals or to declare an initiative invalid, and the limitations on 
jurisdictional authority imposed by the federal system all serve as safeguards 
to limit the voter's freedom about initiation. 
152 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, art 141( I) a-d. 
153 See: Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, art 173 (f), 139 (3) as amended til 15 
October 2002 and Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, art 173 (f), 139 (2) [new], 
as amended til 11 Mai 2004. 
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(b) United States of America/ California 
The Constitution of the United States of America does not allow a 
legal initiative by the people. The submission of constitutional amendments to 
the people for approval is provided for by state legislatures. 154 17 US states 
allow its voters to propose and adopt amendments to the state constitutions, 
but deny them any participation in the legislative process.155 
California is one of the states where people can initiate laws and 
1. . d b. 156 Th constitutional amendments. Proposals are 1m1te to one su ~ect. e 
promoter has to provide a drafted bill and may obtain assistance from the 
1 . 1 . 1 . d . 157 eg1s at1ve counse m omg so. 
California seems similar to New Zealand in respect that people 
theoretically can address all issues. But similar to Switzerland, in California 
two limitations are in effect, which are missing in New Zealand: California is 
part of a federal system and subject has to be addressed as a law. They make 
up for the disability of referenda to express preferences and exclusions 
adequately. Unexpected consequences usually happen only in one part of the 
federation - the state that tries out a new law. The consequences are limited to 
the area of competence. A restraint on the effect of the question is exercised 
by the Californian Judiciary: they can strike down legislation and even 
initiative that are found inconsistent with the state or federal constitution. 158 
With this power the Judiciary is able to limit unexpected consequences or end 
such a situation. Drafting a law allows and demands to predict the effect of the 
statute and take this into account. A draft can more clearly reflect intended 
limitations by its purpose clause, repeals or statements of application of other 
statutes. 
154 Lynn A Baker, "Governing by Initiative: Constitutional Change and Direct Democracy" 
( 1995) 66 University of Colorado Law Review 143. 
155 Baker "Governing by Initiative", above n 154, 143. 
156 California Constitution, art II,§ 8(a), (d), § 12. 
157 California Secretary of State: Ballot Initiatives 2001-2002 
<http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections> (last accessed 16 September 2004). 
158 Gobbi, above n 59, 173. 
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(c) Canada 
The Canadian Constitution restricts national referenda to amendments 
of the constitution. At the same time, those referenda are mandatory. 159 On a 
state level, the situation is quite different: Most jurisdictions allow referenda 
on any subject. But unlike the New Zealand model, it is usually the state 
government, in particular the Executive which initiates referenda. 16° Citizens 
initiated referenda are possible only in Saskatchewan. 
13 Indications drawn from foreign examples 
These examples show a preference for mandatory referenda for 
constitutional amendments on federal level. Only in Switzerland, the people 
can take the initiative to amend the constitution. The proposal will ultimate be 
a draft (most likely from the Government), either as a reaction to a general 
suggestion as in Switzerland or as Government drafts in the first place as in 
the United States or Canada. Initiatives are limited to the states in federal 
systems, where their effects can be controlled. If initiatives are provided for, 
other safeguards are found: either a supreme federal constitution and a 
Judiciary as in California, or indicative or conditioned-binding referenda as in 
the Canadian Provinces and Territories. 
Two directions are indicated by these examples. One shows that the 
more all-embracing an initiative process is the more safeguards are 
implemented to dampen its possible effects. Those safeguards usually consist 
of mechanisms, which in the end take the effective decision away from the 
people. An initiative can be declared unconstitutional by a court. A result 
might not being acted upon in case of an indicative referendum. The other 
direction is the unconditional binding effect in limited cases. These cases 
exclude an initiative or rise government involvement in case an initiative is 
159 Referendum Act RSC 1992, s 3( l ). 
160 Election Act RSA 2000 c E- l ,s 128; Referendum Act RSBC l 996 c 400, s 1( I); Elections 
Act SNB 2000 c E-3 ,s 129( l); Elections Act SNL 1991 c E-3.1, s 217; Plebiscites Act RSPEl 
1988 c P-10, s l ( l ); Referendum Act RSQ 2002 c C-64. l, s 7; Referendum and Plebiscite Act 
RSS 1991 c R-8.01, s 3(1); Plebiscite Act RSNWT 1988 c.P-8, s 3(1); Plebiscite Act RS WT 
1988 c.P-8, s 3(1) (for unavut); Plebiscite Act RSY 2002 c C-172, s 1 (1). 
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provided for, as in Switzerland. And these cases are limited to fundamental 
decisions. 
The New Zealand openness for subjects does allow for referenda on 
constitutional issues and for referenda which results might constitute a change 
of the constitutional framework. In New Zealand, like in Switzerland, 161 the 
Judiciary does not have the power to rule out a law initiated by referendum 
due to inconsistency. But lacking the safeguards implemented in the other 
systems, for example the restriction to government initiatives in Canada, the 
restriction to constitutional amendments in Australia, the supremacy of the 
constitution for initiatives in California or the Swiss Parliament's power to 
invalidate, New Zealand opted for a strict form of option one. 
14 Conclusion 
The lack of subject limitation seems to gather positive responses . This 
openness has been taken advantage of by the people and the form of 
participation by proposing and promoting has been accepted and used. The 
biggest group of issues considered important enough to be put to a national 
vote, are constitutional matters. Direct involvement in decisions of 
constitutional importance is the dominant feature in other jurisdictions. Forms 
of direct participation of the people, direct voting on constitutional issues is 
found is each of them. The subject limitation stands in a direct relationship to 
the effect an initiative has on government. Limitations act as a safeguard. 
Other examples show that the more a binding effect an initiative has, the more 
safeguards are found. These might either be a restriction to government 
initiation. Examples are Australia, Canada, and the United States. All are 
federal states and in all three nations amendments to the federal constitution 
cannot be initiated by citizens. For the federal level as the most influential 
jurisdiction, this is equivalent to no subject availability for citizens initiation 
161 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 Apri I I 999, as amended til IS 
October 2002, art 189; and Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April I 999 
as amended till 11 Mai 2004, art 189. 
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at all. On a Jess influential state level, initiatives have to be rn form of 
proposals, amendments or repeal of statutes. 
B The method of Participation: the Referendum Question 
1 Determination of the question according to the CIR Act 
The CIR Act provides for the proposal to be framed into a question 
which wording "[s}all be such as to ensure that only one of two answers may 
be given to the question." 162 The clause limits the voters to choose between 
two alternatives, which practically provides for a 'yes' or 'no' question. 
2 Process of reduction 
Assuming that a proposal has been admitted to a ballot, at least 10 per 
cent of the eligible voters of New Zealand have agreed that the issue should 
be put on a ballot. That means the issue is controversial and a solution is 
important. The issue poses a problem with at least two alternatives for a 
decision. Proposing that the 10 per cent are not a homogenous group, the issue 
is likely to be far reaching and complex. Being complex, usually more than 
one answers to a question are possible. Yet, the issue in its entire complexity 
has undergone a process of change to a 'this' or 'that' decision. The important 
difference is the number of decisions: one in the CIR referendum. The entire 
issue has undergone a process of reduction. 
3 Situation of complex issues and two-sided answers 
(a) Fundamental criticism 
This scheme has received criticism. A fundamental argument is that 
most often complex issues cannot be compressed into black and white 
answers. 163 This two-sided choice given to the voters is mainly responsible for 
the claim that referenda are simplistic devices, which are not capable of 
162 Citizen Initiated Referenda Act 1993, s IO(l)(b) . 
163 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, 175; Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer 
Bridled Power: New Zealand Govern111e11t under MMP (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1997) 202; Hon Dr M Cullen MP ( I O March 1992) 522 ZPD 6721. 
34 
h .bi 164 dealing with intricate policies if they want to remain compre ens1 e. 
Leaving out the aspect of comprehensiveness, because it is argued from the 
point of view of the voter, the 'not-compressable' argument seems to be 
correct and incorrect at the same time. Issues are complex because there are 
more than two alternatives to a decision and each individual decision may 
lead to one, two or even more other decisions. All aspects are part of the issue. 
Yet, referenda address issues that are complex and ask for a decision on a 
question with two and only two alternatives. The question of the second 
proposal to the CIR Act reads: 
"Should a judge be given the power to decide whether life imprisonment for murder should 
mean a prisoner will be imprisoned for his/her natural life?" 165 
Whether or not a judge should have such power within the structure of 
government is an aspect of separation of powers. Whether or not a state 
should have such power in regard to the human dignity of citizen concerns 
questions of legal, political and philosophical theory. Yet, the question itself, 
though, is a single decision. As a result it seems to give answers to all those 
aspects mentioned above. 
(b) Separate ends in a process 
The situation of contradicting answers can be solved if the complex 
issue and the question is perceived as separate aspects. The issue in its nature 
contains an uncountable number of variations, opportunities, choices and 
alternatives. Any reduction produces something else than the original issue. In 
contrast, the referendum question is nothing more than one answer with two 
choices to one single question. As a result a complex issue indeed cannot be 
compressed in to black and white answers. Never the less, a referendum can 
IM Joseph, above n 33, 188; Palmer, Palmer, above n 163, 202; John Collinge "Keeping a 
Watch on Democracy by Use of Public Referendums" in Alan Simpson (ed) Referendums: 
Constitllfional and Political Perspectives (Victoria University Press, Wellington , I 992) 79, 
83; Dialogue: " o Power to the People in Citizens' Referendum " ( 15 February 200 I) New 
Zealand Herald Auckland. 
165 
Christian Heritage Party of ew Zealand, proposal notice 2784 (14 April 1994) New 
Zealand Ca-::.eue Wellington 1330. 
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address one question. This question can be a part of the issue. The remaining 
question is: What about the rest of all those choices and alternatives? 
(i) Existence of a relationship between the separate aspects 
Another argument is that the referendum question rules out the 
consideration of complex issues. 166 Following the picture of two different 
things, this argument in an other words states that it is not possible to establish 
a relationship between the complete issue itself and the referendum as an 
answer to one (or possibility more) of the aspects of the issue. If the 
complexity of the issue at the beginning and the simplicity of the question at 
the end are separate characters, the argument seems convincing. Complexity 
is contradictory to simplicity. One cannot be changed to fit the other one. But 
it is misleading, because it only considers a 'compression' of issues, a 
'change' of one aspect to fit another one. In consequence, by not regarding 
other options, it leaves an incomplete structure. 
(ii) Nature of relationship between issue and question: reduction 
The existence of referenda, their use in New Zealand and in other parts 
of the world shows that this point of view does leave out the process, which 
fi I ls the gap. The critique can be agreed to and sti II a relationship can be 
established, thus completing the stages of the process, if it is defined as one of 
'reduction'. Instead of 'changing' this is 'reducing' until only one question is 
left. 
(iii) Criticism: unwise public decisions 
Further criticism argues that simplifying the question often fails and 
the system of referenda contradicts with representative government. Because 
modem problems are so complex and interconnected, it takes full time 
thinking to be able to grasp the full range of a problem and make intelligent 
choices about an issue. The limited time, effort and access to the necessary 
166 Hon Dr M Cullen (l O March 1992) 522 NZPD 6721. 
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information prevents ordinary citizens from reaching this stage. Instead, 
representatives are paid to do just this : to devote their entire time and effort to 
achieve this goal. 167 
By focussing on the process of reduction it becomes evident that a 
serious problem of referenda has not been properly allocated. 
(iv) The attempt to simplify a question 
An attempt to bridge the gap between issue and question is made by 
comprehension of the matter's complexity. The question is simplified. This 
attempt often fails. In contrast, a practical result often is a question which 
tends to be misleading, confusing, and ends up long-winded. 168 This argument 
leads to three different effects according to the actors involved: Promoter, 
receiver (people) and issue (question). The promoter could formulate 
questions that anticipate the answer, are emotive in nature or use question-
begging language. 169 Such rhetorical-linguistic aspects are an undue influence 
into the decision making process. On the receiving side, the voter might not 
understand the question , which causes confusion. The confusion could lead to 
resentment and/or anger towards the individual referendum or the institution 
altogether and effect the referendum turnout. 170 The lack of understanding is a 
serious problem for the concept of democracy itself. It reveals the influence of 
public education as an external factor for its success. Resentment makes the 
voter tum away from the democratic system. Democracy suffers a low voter 
turnout and a loss of respect for parliaments' authority (or the government's). 
A vague and multi-faceted content of a referendum question could cloud, not 
clarify the issues the promoters have put forth for consideration. 171 Thus 
neither the proposal not the vote adds anything to bring the actual issue to a 
solution. 
167 Butler, Ranney, above n 11, 34. 
168 Goschik, above n 42, 718. 
169 Goschik, above n 42, 716. 
170 David B Magleby Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions i11 c/ie United States 
(John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1984) 143; Bob Edlin "A Grind Exercise in 
Ballot-box Absurdity" (8 December 1995) The !ndepe11de11t Wellington 10. 
171 Morris, above n 32, 45. 
(v) New Zealand example 
One New Zealand proposal read: 
"Should the Treaty of Waitangi, being an outdated document, be set aside and replaced with a 
national constitution which guarantees the equal rights to all New Zealanders without favour 
or discrim.ination?" 172 
The question calls the Treaty of Waitangi an outdated document. But 
actually only the voters decisions (if the referendum would have been 
binding) would have made it one. To set aside a document which is already 
outdated appears less significant than setting aside a document and thereby 
outdating it. The wording of the question seems to cloud the importance of the 
decision. A constitution in a unitary state is by definition national. Is the term 
used to clear matters or to develop a feeling of 'nationalism' thus approaching 
the voter on an emotional basis? The question, having 31 words in total, 
touches three different issues (importance of Treaty of Waitangi in specific, 
constitutional law in general, human rights in general), calls for two actions 
(setting aside one and enacting another document/documents) and makes three 
defining statements (outdated, guarantees to all New Zealanders, no favour or 
discrimination). 
From a 'reductionist' point of view, these uncertainties seem to be 
technical aspects of the reduction process. Where ever exception, conditions, 
even multi-side structured sentences remain, the process has not been carried 
through its end. Questions have not been answered yet, to make the final 
question suitable for a referendum proposal. In this respect, opponents of 
referenda are right in their criticism that referenda question could be 
misleading, could be emotional, therefore could cause confusion. But for the 
process of reduction, they do not have to be. The aspects concern the process, 
172 Mark Whyte proposal, otice 1725 (20 March 1997) New Zealand Ca~ette Wellington 
642. 
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but not referenda as an institution itself. Thus, concentrating on reduction, the 
criticism misses the point. 
(vi) Practicability: a need to simplify 
Proponents argue that even though simplification of complex issues might 
be difficult and certainly contains the danger of misleading questions, it is a 
necessary element of referenda, because everything else is absolutely 
impracticable. 173 There seems not much to argue about the claim that in order 
to settle any complex issue at the end of a process a final decision has to be 
made. In some cases this argument seems to prevail while the fears of the 
opponents ofreferenda seem to be unnecessary. For example, the questions of 
one referendum held in 1999 read: 
"Should the size of the House of Representatives be reduced from 120 members to 99 
members?" [Number of MP's referendum] 
The number of MP's does have an effect on the size of constituencies for 
reasons of equal value of each vote. More important, it has financial aspects. 
They are likely to influence the political field (how many parties compete in 
parliament, how many candidates compete in the electorates ... ?) The voters 
can answer a question without exceptions, conditions etc. But from a 
reductionist point of view, this question is equally complicated as the other 
ones. More decisions have to be made alongside the track. The difference is 
that it is taken care of who has to make them. 
The other question of the 1999 referendum read: 
"Should there be a reform of our justice system placing greater emphasis on the needs of 
victims, providing restitution and compensation for them and imposing minimum 
sentences and hard labour for all serious violent offenders?" [justice reform referendum]. 174 
173 Helena Catt, Paul Harris and Nigel S Roberts Voter's Choice: Electoral Change in New 
Zealand? (Dunmore Press, Palmerston orth, 1992) 134; Venice Commission "Guidelines for 
Constitutional Referendums at National Level" (Venice Commission, Strasbourg, 2001) 
<http://venice.coe.int> (last accessed 16 September 2004). 
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• otice 7159 (09 October 1997) New Zealand Ca -::eue Wellington 3423. 
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While the first question can be described as dealing with a relatively 
simple numerical constitutional issue, the wording of the second i II ustrates a 
whole set of concerns of the critics: Who would not be for a harsh punishment 
of violent offenders and a system that emphasises the need of victims? But do 
both aspects really go together? Or do they even belong together? How does 
one vote, if one is for a reform of the justice system but against minimum 
sentences? Does a reform of the justice system necessarily place greater 
emphasis on the needs of victims? Or are there other areas in desperate need 
for a reform which do not have anything to do with the treatment of the needs 
of victims? What about international treaties about the treatment of prisoners 
and 'hard labour' ? What does 'hard labour' mean? How does one define a 
'serious violent offence'? The number of questions demonstrates but one 
thing: A need for more answers. 
A need for more answers creates another difficulty in the process. 
Each question before the final one can direct the referendum into another 
direction. For example, the proposal of the Royal New Zealand Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Inc. started out with the question: 
"Should the inhumane practice of battery egg production be phased out within five years from 
thi s referendum?" 175 
The petition question was determined to be: 
"Should the production of eggs from battery hens be prohibited within five years of the 
referendum?" 
176 
The difference resulted in a legal battle between the promoter and the Clerk 
of the House. In the promoters' opinion the question missed the importance of 
relevant factors or stressed irrelevant ones. 177 It might be possible to simplify 
an issue in order to make it practicable. But at the same time this creates the 
175 Royal ew Zealand Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Inc. Proposal, notice 
976 (10 February 1994) New Zealand Ca -::,e tte Wellington 719. 
176 Notice 3107 (28 April 1994) New Zealand Gazette Wellington 1452 . 
177 Goschi k, above n 42, 7 I 2. 
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difficulty of meeting the promoter's intention. Missing the intention nullifies 
the whole purpose of giving voters a chance to bring their issues forward. 
Additional to the other problems of simplifying a complex issue, the issue also 
might simply be missed by the question. 
(vii) Summary 
The debate around referendum questions focuses on comprehension of 
matters and simplification of questions. It is agreed that simplification is 
necessary to make a referendum practicable and that questions are in the 
danger of being misleading, confusing and not comprehending the entire 
complex issue. This argumentation seems to focus on the referendum as a 
method to solve an issue (or determine an outcome), thus as partly the same 
thing (the issue itself and the determination of the issue as part of it). But it 
seems preferable to view both of them as separate aspects. There are the 
complex issue and the referendum. Both are connected by a process of 
reduction . At its beginning there are all those questions that make the issue a 
complex one. At its end there is one question left to decide. 
(c) The contradiction to representative government 
Simplification of the question is one aspect. Another argument against 
referenda states that the referendum-answer as much as the referendum-
concept itself contradicts the system of representative government. 
(i) Representative Government and the decision making process 
Opponents of direct democracy argue that a referendum is a vote 
which only states a numerical support for two irreconcilable alternatives. 178 
But the goal of a democratic system is to reach a consensus. 
According to John Stuart Mill, representative democracy means "that 
the whole people, or some numerous portion of them, exercise through 
178 Buller, Ranney, above n 11, 35. 
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deputies periodically elected by themselves the ultimate controlling power, 
which, in every constitution, must reside somewhere". 179 The power resides in 
Parliament as the supreme assembly. The mandate of the representatives is a 
legally free one, once legitimately elected by the people. 180 The free-mandate 
theory assumes that the representative will be "sensitive to the opinions and 
interests of his constituents". 181 But a representative also has the overall 
welfare of the state in mind. For both, the best decisions are obtained by the 
process of debate and consensus. 
Supported by the modern system of political parties, the representative 
system passes individual views "through medium[s] of [a] chosen body[ies] of 
citizens". 182 The representative decides on behalf of the people. 183 As a result 
it is the purpose of Parliament to determine public policy. 
The main quality of the parliamentary process is free debate. 184 The 
debate introduces the views of the people, presents the expertise of the 
representatives, helps define the greatest possible benefit for the country as a 
whole, helps to realise the politically possible and eventually arrives at a 
compromise. A consensus is believed to be able to gather the greatest 
agreement to a certain course of action and to lead to the best solution by 
promoting common interests. Such a consensus can be reached best in 
Parliament, where for careful and considerate deliberation is provided for by 
rules for debate and procedure, and the necessary pool of information is 
concentrated and accessible to those involved. 185 
(ii) Role of voter in a referendum 
179 John Stuart Mill Considerations on Representative Covem111ent R.B. Mc Callum (ed) (new 
edition, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1946). 
180 Walker, above n 27, 30. 
181 Walker, above n 27, 30. 
182 James Madison The Federalist No. JO. 
183 James Madison The Federalist No. JO. 
18
~ John McMenemy The Language of Canadian Politics (John Wiley & Sons, Toronto, 1980) 
235. 
185 Butler, Ranney, above n 11, 35. 
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In contrast, the role of the voter in an election as much as in a 
referendum is to make clear-cut decisions one way or the other. The debate, 
the struggle of opinion, the possibility of compromise and the flexibility to 
reach the best solution for the national interest, is missing. Because of the 
missing elements referenda decisions lack the quality of parliamentary 
deliberation. 186 
(d) The contrary element 
It might be argued that gathering 10 per cent of signatures and 
bringing an issue to national recognition stirs and provides for another form of 
debate and a form of informal deliberation. But other important aspects are 
missing: the decisions which have to be made along the way and their 
legitimacy. The contrary element is that in a referendum the voter is supposed 
to make a decision about an entire issue. But what really is being decided is 
only the very last question . 
As the previous discussion about the process of reduction only sees the 
end of that process, so does the argument of the importance of a debate. At the 
end of a reduction remains one question. At the end of a debate remain 
compromises. In their complexity they are able to embrace all aspects of the 
complex issue. But more interestingly seems to be what is in the middle. The 
debate allows separation and listing. Deliberation allows the discovery of 
interrelations . The compromise itself is a result of previous decisions by 
which a certain line was followed, a certain direction intended. Politicians do 
not comprehend a complex issue any better than the average person. The 
compromise, reached in Parliament and agreed on is only the enforcement of 
the sum of single decisions leading to the final one. 
(i) The referendum process: reduction by dec iding 
186 Wolf Linder Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multirnlt11ral Socie ties 
(2nd ed, MacMillan , ew York, 1998) 111. 
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The problem solving process is not bound to an institution. The 
process of making an issue suitable for a referendum operates the same. 
'Reducing' means deciding all, but a final option of an issue. The last answer 
is given, and one last option is favoured, because all previous ones lead to it 
by their specific choice. Vice versa, the last decision influences all previous 
ones. The last answer is the top of a hierarchical pyramid. The complex issue 
which lies at the heart of the referendum is the starting point. The issue is 
neither squeezed, changed nor modified, but separated in the many answers 
needed to fully comprehend the original issue. Each single question is 
accounted for and decided along the course. The process continues until only 
one decision is left to be made. At its end all questions are answered. None is 
left out. 
(ii) Reduction as a referendum problem 
A referendum symbolises the last step of the reduction process. It is 
contrary to the system of representative government, because it does not state 
where, when and how the intermediate decisions are made. It is contrary, 
because these middle steps are able to influence the outcome. The 'justice 
reform referendum' illustrates this problem: The referendum question is in the 
need for more answers. The mere attempt to answer the question is like 
opening Pandora's box: Once opened, one cannot escape to address other 
issues. The transformation of a complex issue into a single 'black' or ' white ' 
question cannot circumvent all the alternatives and crossroads which make an 
issue complex. 
An uncertainty is added to the problem: When will the issues tum up? 
Do they have to be decided before the referendum question? Predetermination 
of certain decisions might diminish actual effects a referendum decision could 
have before it has even been put to the voters. The other alternative is to 
decide these questions after the referendum. This opens the theoretical 
possibility of circumventing the referendum decision by subsequent 
alternatives. The actual implementation of the details could produce effects 
not included by the intention of the referendum vote. 
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(e) Australia 
An example of the difficulties of the reduction of a complex issue to a 
'yes' or 'no' alternative is given by a recent Australian referendum. As in 
New Zealand, federal Australian legislation provides for proposals to be 
formulated as a 'yes/no' option. 187 
(i) The 1999 Australian republic referendum 
In 1999 Australia held a referendum about whether to become a 
republic or not. A half-elected Constitutional Convention decided that this 
was an issue for the people to vote on. The decision to become a republic was 
tied to the adoption of a so called "bipartisan appointment of a president 
model". 188 In this model the president would have been appointed by the 
Prime Ministers' and Opposition Leaders' motion with the approval of the 
Commonwealth Parliament. 189 
(ii) Referendum question 
The following two questions were put to the vote on two separate ballot 
papers: 190 
"A Proposed Law 
To alter the Constitution to establish the Commonwealth of Australia as a republic with 
the Queen and Governor-General being replaced by a President appointed by a two-
thirds majority of the members or the Commonwealth Parliament." 
And 
"A Proposed Law 
187 Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act (Cth) 1984, s 25, schedule 1, Form B. 
188 Constitution Alteration (Establishment of a Republic) Bill 1999 (Cth), explanatory 
memorandum para 1.1., <parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au> (last accessed 24 November 2004). 
189 Constitution Alteration (Establishment or Republic) Bill 1999 (Cth), Schedule 1, section 3. 
190 Australian Electoral Commission 1999 Referendum Reports and Statistics 
<www.aec.gov.au> (last accessed 15 December 200..i). 
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To alter the Constitution to insert a preamble." 
(iii) Referendum results 
The referendum was rejected by 54.87 per cent and the majority in all 
States. The result seems to indicate that Australians were opposed to the 
concept of a republic. But this conclusion is contrary to the opinion polls prior 
and after the referendum. 
(iv) Contrary opinion polls 
Opinion polls about whether Australia should remain a monarchy or 
become a republic have been held since 1953. 21 polls until 2000 indicated an 
overall rise in support for a republic. Since 1993 the proponents of a republic 
had a constant majority. In the three polls since 1997 until the referendum the 
majority has been above 50 per cent. 191 The constant rise and the constant 
support above 50 per cent could be interpreted as strong indicators for the 
referendum question not being able to adequately address the issue. But it 
does not give a hint towards the conclusion that the result is originated in any 
difficulties connected with the reduction to a 'yes' or 'no' question. But while 
any reason for the referendum results originated in anything else than the 
implications made in the question would suggest a drop of support for a 
republic during or after the referendum, an opinion poll two weeks after the 
referendum in fact continued to show significant and majority support for a 
bi
. 19') 
repu ,c. -
It could also be argued that the polls showed a selective count only, 
and the referendum failed, because the proponents for some reason remained 
absent form the ballot. Any doubt of the accuracy of the poll showing a 
191 The Roy Morgan Research Centre Ply. Limited, Finding o. 3296 18 April 2000, Table 3 
<oldwww.roymorgan.com> (last accessed 24 ovember 2004). 
192 The Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty. Limited, above n 191, Finding o. 3296 18 April 
2000, Table. 
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majority in favour of a republic would have to explain its grounds in the light 
of a nationwide voter turnout of 95. l per cent of eligible electors.
193 
A poll held in March/ April 2000 instead showed a decline in support 
from 54 per cent (post referendum poll 1999) to 49 per cent. It has to be noted 
though, that proponents of a monarchy still gathered only 40 per cent support. 
Further, the poll was held during the 13th visit of the Queen of England to 
Australia. Polls in all states showed a support for a republic. Though in all 
states the Queen visited, support dropped between two per cent and 11 per 
cent. Only in South Australia, which was not visited by the Queen, support 
rose to an all time high of 55 per cent.
194 The time passed since the 
referendum and the different results in the states visited/not visited by the 
Queen allow for the conclusion that difference in poll and referendum results 
were not due to the issue of a republic but to the difficulties in reducing the 
issue itself. 
(f) Reduction and the Australian referendum question 
The reduction led to a peculiar result. The referendum question 
contained three further statements about the future republic: A preamble to the 
constitution, the establishment of a president, and a decision of who and how 
is to appoint the president. The preamble statement did not contain any further 
information, that might have said anything about the overall structure of the 
republic. Thus there is no indication that the preamble question could have 
been the origin of the diversion between the majority support in the polls and 
the failing of the referendum. The establishment of a president is the decisive 
feature of a republic in contrast to a monarchy. Support for a republic 
therefore includes the replacement of a monarch. The modem element of 
replacement is a president. In consequence, again there is no indication that a 
president could have influenced the original support for a republic to the 
negative. The question of who and how to appoint a president can differ in the 
193 Australian Electoral Commission l 999 Referendum Reports and Statistics 
<http://www.aec.gov.au> (last accessed 20 October 2004). 
19
~ The Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty. Limited, above n 191, Finding o. 3296 18 April 
2000. 
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various types of republics. The issue is important to the general structure. It is 
the major difference to a monarchy, where the people do not have any 
possibility to influence or take part in the decision of who is to be head of 
state. In summary, the republic question with its three additional statements 
together asked the voter to decide on but two important, different, but 
interrelated issues: The replacement of monarchy by republic as of whether 
the head of state should in any way be dependent on another authority, and the 
appointment by the Parliament as of who shall this authority be. The 
continued support of a republic in the polls suggests that the second issue 
would have been the relevant cause for the referendum to fall short of the 
indicated majority. Further, since it is a decision that along the course has to 
be made at some point of time, but in fact was made prior to the referendum 
and not by the people, the result suggests that it was this decision that gave 
cause to the divergence between poll and result. 
The outcome of the Australian referendum demonstrates the reduction 
problem. In the course of limiting the issue to a two alternative question, 
decisions have to be made. The influence of some of them on the entire issue 
could be so important that it diverts from the point of the actual 'last' question 
and reverses the outcome a referendum would show otherwise. The 
referendum with its single, extracted question expresses a general intent. Due 
to the decisions made in between, this statement could prove unable to be 
transferred back to the full range of the issue. The decision of the voter would 
be unable to have the expressed intended effect on the issue. 
(g) Reduction as a legitimacy problem 
Besides the problem of effect of intermediate decisions, the Australian 
referendum demonstrates the second aspect of the problem: Who is to make 
these (necessary) decisions? 
(i) Legitimacy in representative democracy 
48 
In parliamentary debate all answers are given by the representatives. 
Each single decision carries the legitimacy of the power transferred by 
election for a certain time. The sum of the single decisions legitimises the 
whole. 
(ii) Legitimacy in popular vote 
A decision by referendum 1s argued to have a greater legitimacy, 
because laws instituted as a result of referendums are more clearly and 
directly derived from the popular expression of the people's will. 195 This 
argument would be a strong one, if the popular decision could be traced back 
to all effects, the referendum has . But this is not the case. 
(iii) Obstruction of legitimacy trace by reduction decisions 
Instead, as the Australian referendum shows, important decisions can 
be taken not only out of the hands of the public, but also out of the hands of 
the elected representatives. The decision for the bipartisan-model was made 
by a half-elected constitutional convention. Not only the fact of a convention 
only half-elected, but more the possibility of bodies without a legitimacy trace 
making important decisions if of concern. 
This concern leads back to the contradiction caused by a referendum. 
One opposing argument is that referenda upset the system of accountability. 
Representative democracy with free mandate is based on accountability 
through general election only. 196 Its rigid version claims that the 
representative is absolutely free in his or her dec isions once legitimately 
197 f elected by the people. From this ongm the system o responsible 
government and ministerial responsibility has deve loped, which direct 
legislation is inconsistent with. 198 Against this argument is stated that both 
sy terns itself are imperfect and referenda are a valuable complement to 
195 Walker, above n 27, 50. 
196 Rt Hon J Hunt MP ( 10 March 1992) 522 NZPD 6715; Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System, 175. 
197 F Canavan The Political Reason of Ed1111111d Burke (Durham .C. , 1960) 148, 149. 
198 Walker, above n 27, 61. 
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representative government. Both systems intend to help the people and can be 
carefully constructed so that they will balance the weaknesses of one with the 
strength with the other system. 199 
The opposing argument states that the contradiction with 
representative government is caused, due to the effects referenda have or 
might have on the secondary aspects that is how the details of accountability 
are balanced and how the system is tuned to efficiency. On a primary basis 
representative government depends on legitimacy of the transfer of authority 
as its core democratic element. 200 Proponents refer to the same grounds with 
the claim that a referendum enjoys an even greater legitimacy for the deciding 
body is the holder of the ultimate authority. 20 1 While the common 
denominator of both systems is the undisrupted trace of legitimacy - indirect 
or direct - both sides fail to recognise the lack of legitimacy in a referendum 
decision with reduction decisions made by a third party. The referendum is 
contrary to representative government, because the reduction process by itself 
is not able to secure a coherent trace of legitimacy to all decisions. 
4 Conclusion 
The analysis of the referendum question has shown that the process 
from a complex issue to a referendum question is one of reduction. Reduction 
is dividing an issue into its basic questions and deciding them one by one. The 
problem of the process is the authority to make the intermediate decisions. 
Democracy includes a trace of legitimacy from the holder of power to the 
decisions. This trace is interrupted, when an intermediate decision is made by 
a third party that lacks this authority. 
To avoid third party involvement, the reduction process has to be 
limited to the two remaining actors: The elected representatives or the people 
as a whole. Taken the aim of the direct democracy movement as to enable the 
199 MD Waters "Do Ballot Initiatives Undermine Democracy?" Cato Institute Policy Report 
July/August 2000, 7. 
zoo See: Aristotle The Politica, Book IV - VI (Corpus Aristotelicum, 1296 b 14 - 16). 
201 Weale, above n 3, 24. 
so 
people to bring forward their own issues and decide them,202 it seems contrary 
to involve representatives to 'assist' in the reduction process for reasons of 
possible influence as stated above. To be coherent in the struggle to allow the 
people to decide directly on complex issues, the entire reduction process 
would have to be imposed on them. In consequence, each individual aspect, in 
a representative system issue of debate and compromise, would have to be 
separated and presented to the voters. Besides the technical difficulties such as 
agreement on the reduction process, proposal , ballot, costs it seems arguable 
whether the need to answer dozens and dozens of individual questions to 
finally reach the referendum ballot would not reverse the intention of 
participation and voter turnout. 203 The existence of a coherent trace of 
legitimacy needs to be secured. 
Because of this need, the CIR Act should provide safeguards for the 
reduction process. Safeguards are needed for questions that are considered 
important. Important in the end is a question, when its result is acted upon, be 
it by legal or by moral force. For practical reasons such as accessibility of 
information, time, resources such safeguards should be government 
institutions. 
C The Effect of Participation: the Indicative Nature of CIR Act 
referenda 
The CIR Act allows for referenda that are indicative in nature only.204 
Its long title expressly states that the "results of which referenda will indicate 
the views held by the people of New Zealand ... but will not be binding on the 
New Zealand Govemment."205 Its non-binding nature makes the ew Zealand 
citizens initiative a unique one in comparison to other jurisdictions. 
202 See: Ian Budge The New Challenge of Direct Democracy (Po lity Press, Cambridge, 1996) 
2, 3. 
203 Hon D A M Graham MP ( 14 September I 993) 538 ZPD I 7963; Morris, above n 32, 44. 
204 Citizens Initi ated Referenda Act 1993. 
205 Citizens Initiated Referenda Act I 993, long title. 
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1 Effects of referenda in other jurisdictions 
(a) Switzerland 
Referenda on a federal level in Switzerland are binding on the 
government.206 The binding nature is accompanied by a set of features, which 
form the standing of direct democracy in Switzerland: The Swiss Constitution 
provides for mandatory207 and optional208 referenda. The former is limited to 
issues of total or partial revision of the Constitution, entry in international 
organisations and urgent legislation. The latter one depends on a citizens' 
initiation and deals with all Federal Statutes, certain urgent Federal Statues, 
Federal Decrees to the extent the Constitution or a statute foresees this and 
some international treaties. The Constitution does not impose any restrictions 
on legislation passed or failed by referendum, except for urgent legi slation, 
which may not be renewed if it was not adopted in a popular vote.209 
This model is carried on in all 26 Swiss state constitutions. 210 Binding 
referenda are mandatory in case of a partial or total revision of the 
constitution. Introduction, amendment or repeal of state laws e ither depends 
on mandatory or optional referenda. Some constitutions make the spending of 
state funds above a certain amount dependent on approva l of the peop le. 
(b) Canada 
In Canada on a federal level and in most state legis lations referenda 
are indicative. Only in Alberta, Briti sh Columbia and Saskatchewan res ults 
may be binding under certain conditions.2 11 
206 Federal Constitution of the Swi s Confederation, art 139 (6) arg umentum e contrari o. 
207 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederati on, art 140. 
208 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, art 141. 
209 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, art 165 (4). 
210 See the constitutions of the Swiss Cantons <http ://www.verfassungen.de/ch/kan tone. htm> 
(last accessed 29 November 2004). 
211 Tim Mowrey and Alain Pe lletier " Referendums in Canada - A comparative overview" in: 
Electoral Insight - January 200 1 (Electi ons Canada), <http://www.electi ons.ca> (las t accessed 
10 November 2004). 
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(c) Australia 
In Australia all referenda are binding. Federal Australia and three 
states/tenitory have mandatory referenda.212 In three other states referenda are 
government initiated.21 3 In the Northern Tenitory referenda are initiated by 
the Legislative Assembly.214 
(d) USA 
Referenda in the states of the United States, as far as the form is 
adopted, are binding.215 
2 Binding effect of referenda 
The binding nature is the dominant aspect of referenda in other 
jurisdictions, except in Canada. Whereas all but one Canadian j urisdiction216 
share with Australia the absence of referenda initiated by citizens. Unlike 
Australia, Canadian referenda even on national level are mostly indicative. 
Those Canadian jurisdictions that provide for binding referenda have 
incorporated provisions, which allow the government to eventually determine 
the binding nature of a referendum. 
This divides the mentioned jurisdictions. In one group a referendum is 
binding and government or citizens initiated. In the other group a referendum 
is not binding but government initiated only. Only Saskatchewan has a model 
that provides for citizens initiative which may be indicative: even though the 
effect of an initiative can be detennined by the government, the model still 
provides for the possibility of an ultimately binding referendum, once 
212 Commonwealth of Australia - Constitution of Australia, s 128 ( I); ew South Wales -
Constitution Act 1902 (NSW), s 7 A, B: South Australia - Constitution Act 1934 (SA), s 88 
(2)b; Victoria - Constitution Act 1975 (Vic). s 18: Australian Capital Territory - Referendum 
(Machinery Provi sio ns) Act 1994 (ACT). s 5(1) for all laws required to be submitted to a 
re ferendum under Subsection 26(2) of the Australian Capital Territory (Self Government) Act 
1988 of the Commonwealth. 
213 Queensland - Referendums Act 1997 (Qld), s 4( I); Tasmania - Referendum Procedures 
Act 1994 (Tas), s 5( I) ; Western Australia - Referend ums Act 1983 (WA), s 4( I) . 
214 orthern Territory - Referendums Act 200 I ( T), s 6( I). 
2 15 Collins, Oesterle, above n 71, 49 . 
216 Saskatchewan - Referendum and Plebiscite Act RSS 1991 c R-8.0 I, s 7(1 ). 
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government has made a decision. 217 In contrast, New Zealand allows its 
citizens to take the initiative but has not enacted any provisions for an 
initiative to be binding. The only way for a New Zealand referendum result to 
become binding on government is by self-imposed commitment enacted 
through legislation. In further contrast to government initiated referenda, 
where the binding nature is determined by legislation before the referendum is 
held, any self-imposed legislation concerning a citizens initiative would be 
enacted after the referendum had been held. 
(a) Reasons for non binding nature of the CIR referendum 
According to the former Minister of Justice, the Hon. D A M Graham 
MP, two reasons lead to the introduction of a non binding referendum for 
New Zealand: first, the importance of some decisions. Second, the possibility 
to make decisions which are actually supported only by a minority of citizens, 
which overseas experience has shown to happen. 
(i) Final decisions on important issues 
The Hon DAM Graham MP explained that '[m]atters relating to the 
security of the country, of foreign policy, or even relating to fiscal policy, are 
generally of such importance as to require the Government to make the final 
decisions." Such "issues must always remain the responsibility of the 
Government of the day." 218 The statement implies that a binding effect would 
extend to all issues addressed. The alternative of excluding issues, which are 
thought to require a final decision made by Government, was considered, but 
rejected. The benefit of "allowing the public to express its views on any topic 
rather than having a restricted list" thought to be greater than the benefit of 
making binding decisions about limited topics. 21 9 
The reason given why some matters had to remain in Governments 
exclusive competence was that in such matters "only the Government is likely 
217 Mowrey, Pelletier, above n 211. 
2 18 
( I O March 1992) 522 NZPD 6704. 
2 19 (10March 1992)522 ZPD6704. 
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to be in possession of all of the information on which decisions have to be 
d "·no Th' h f · d. d ma e. -- 1s statement touc es two aspects o promotmg trect emocracy: 
the process by which decisions should be reached in a democracy and the 
intellectual ability of the public to understand the referendum proposal itself 
and comprehend the underlying issue. The argumentation about the contrary 
concepts of direct democracy vs representative government, debate, 
deliberation and consensus in parliament and voter confusions as stated above, 
apply.221 
(ii) Danger of minority rule and voter tum out 
The main argument was that overseas experience has shown that 
referenda attract a low voter tum out, even when it is binding.222 The Hon D A 
M Graham MP argued that in case of a voter tum out as low as perhaps 35 per 
cent a simple majority (perhaps only 51 per cent) would amount to less than 
20 per cent of those eligible to vote. Such a minority would be able to pass a 
decision, which would be imposed on the whole. The result would claim 
legitimacy due to a maj01ity vote. In consequence, a minority would be able to 
impose their will. 
(iii) Tyranny of the majority 
This argumentation leads to another concern expressed by the 
minister: minority groups might be oppressed. 223 Opponents of direct 
democracy call it the tyranny of the majority.224 Referenda are considered to 
be more dangerous to minority rights than legislative assemblies. 225 Reasons 
for this are that the voting mass is less considerate of those rights than 
representatives. The need to reach a consensus and the subsequent process of 
debate, deliberation and consideration as much as the reflection on intensities 
of believes makes the representative body more sensitive to the overall 
220 
( 10 March 1992) 522 NZPD 6704. 
22 1 See Ill C 3 (b) ff. 
222 (l O March I 992) 522 ZPD 6704. 
223 
( l O March 1992) 522 ZPD 6705. 
224 Collins, Oesterle, above n 71, 60. 
225 Butler, Ranney, above n 11, 36. 
situation. Voters lack this motivation. In contrast, without careful deliberation 
the factor 'emotion' gains more weight. As a result, referenda tend to target 
rights of such groups more vigorously the smaller the group is or the stronger 
negative emotions against such groups generally are. Examples are the 
adopted initiatives barring legal protection for gays and requiring Catholic 
children to attend public schools in Oregon, or a law disabling Japanese 
farmers from owning land in California.226 
(b) Arguments against non-binding nature 
On the contrary, the New Zealand non-binding option has been 
criticised. Arguments from within the legislature stated that the effect of a non 
binding referendum was argued to be fraudulent and discouraging to those 
people who believe in the instrument of referenda.227 People were frustrated, 
because they had the feeling that their parliament and government were not 
listening to them. To improve this situation, the people wanted a binding 
referendum. 228 The CIR referendum, on the other hand, is a "toothless 
wonder".229 Parliament in some instances was acting contrary to popular 
belief. This was a reason for the declining development of public opinion for 
politicians.230 Academic argumentation focussed more on theoretical 
inconsistencies: a non-binding referendum is not coherent, thus not true 
democracy (but an illusion) when ordinary people are allowed to choose 
governments by means of regular elections, if one does not grant them the 
capability to make important direct decisions on particular issues. 231 
Interesting but not surprising, politicians did not pick up on these theoretical 
issues and their practical consequences for the entire concept of the 
introduction of a citizens initiative: Not participation but effective 
participation with the CIR Act is an illusion. Governmental non-compliance 
with referenda results unfolds the nature of the CIR Act as an illusion. The 
illusion could provoke a feeling of helplessness about influencing the state of 
226 Collins, Oesterle, above n 71, 58. 
227 Rt Hon D Lange MP (I O March 1992) 522 ZPD 6708. 
228 G Hawk.ins MP ( I O March 1992) 522 NZPD 67 I 8. 
229 P Hodgson MP ( 14 September 1993) 538 ZPD 17958. 
230 I Peters MP ( 14 September 1993) 538 ZPD 1796 I. 
23 1 Budge, above n 202, 2, 3. 
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the nation. Contemplating about the governmental commitment to lessen the 
gap between the people and its representative institutions and experiencing the 
practical results, the people might become more frustrated and disappointed. 
As a result the gap might become even bigger. Instead of enhancing 
participation as intended, frustration could provoke the exact result, which the 
referendum initially attempted to cure: Disappointed people remain absent 
from the ballot. The voter tum out could become lower than without a non-
binding referendum. A governmental policy or specific decisions ultimately 
would rest on even less votes. Contrary to the main argument of the direct 
democracy debate, a non-binding, citizens initiated referenda could even 
lessen the legitimacy of the exercise of power. 
In New Zealand the three referenda attracted a voter turnout of 27.7 
per cent in 1995 and 83.1 per cent for two referenda in 1999.232 The New 
Zealand Government has not acted upon any of the three referendum 
results.
233 
The voter turnout for general elections was: 78.6 per cent in 1990, 
79.6 per cent in 1993, 83.1 per cent in 1996, 76.l per cent in 1999, and 72.5 
per cent in 2002.234 
3 Overseas experience 
(a) Canada 
In Federal Canada, a total of three referenda have been held so far: in 
1898, 1942, and 1992.235 The voter tum out to this last referendum was 71,8 
per cent.236 In the period from 1945 to about 1988, the voter tum out in the 
general Canadian election averaged about 75 per cent. Two significant 
232 See statistic on the database of C2D - Research and Documentation Centre on Direct 
Democracy of the University of Geneve, <http://c2d.unige.ch> (last accessed 14 December 
2004). 
233 Morris, above n 32, 44, 46. 
234 Figures are based on population old enough to vote (V AP). Voter turn out based on 
registered voters: 85.2 per cent in t 990, 85.2 per cent in 1993, 88.3 per cent in 1996, 84.8 per 
cent in 1999, and 77.0 per cent in 2002. Data from IDEA International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter Turnout New Zealand, <www.idea.int> (last 
accessed 14 December 2004); see also: Ministry of Social Development "The Social Report 
2004 - Voter Turnout" <http://socialreport.msd.govt.nz> (last accessed 20 December 2004). 
235 Mowrey, Pelletier, above n 211, Table I. 
236 Mowrey, Pelletier, above n 211, Table 2. 
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exceptions in 1974 and 1980 were believed to rest on grounds of a climate of 
relative public dissatisfaction with politics in general.237 From around the 
period of the last referendum the voter turnout continuously declined: 69.6 per 
cent in 1993; 67.8 per cent in 1997, and 64.l per cent in 2000.238 
(b) United Kingdom 
Between 1990 and 2004 the United Kingdom has not held a nationwide 
referendum. Voter turnouts on general elections were: 75.4 per cent in 1992, 
69.4 per cent in 1997, and 57.6 per cent in 2001.239 
(c) Switzerland 
Since an average voter turnout around 58 per cent until World War I, this 
average has constantly declined. 240 Voter turnout in the last four federal 
elections were: 39.7 per cent in 1991, 35.7 per cent in 1995, 34.9 per cent in 
1999, and 45.8 per cent (registered voter) in 2003.241 
(d) United States I California 
The voter turnout for the presidential election in the United States was: 55.2 
per cent in 1992, 47.2 per cent in 1996, and 49.3 per cent in 2000. 242 The 
individual California turnout in the national general election was: 49.4 per 
237 Elections Canada"Explaining the Turnout Decline in Canadian Federal Elections: A new 
Survey on Non-voters" (Online publications). 
238 Figures are based on registered voters. Voter turn out based on the population old enough 
to vote (YAP) was 63.9 per cent in 1993 and 56.2 per cent in 1997; see: Andre Blais, 
Agnieszka Dobrzynska, Louis Massicotte "Why is Turnout Higher in Some Countries than in 
Others?" Elections Canada on line-publications (March 2003), appendix B; 
<www.elections.ca> (last accessed 14 December 2004). 
239 Figures are based on YAP. Voter turn out based on registered voters: 77.3 per cent in 
1992, 71.5 per cent in 1997 and 59.4 per cent in 200 I. Data from LDEA International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter Turnout United Kingdom, above n 234. 
240 Butler, Ranney, above n 11, 45. 
241 Figures are based on YAP. Voter turn out based on registered voters: 46.0 per cent in 
1991, 42.3 per cent in 1995, 43.2 per cent in 1999, 45.8 per cent in 2003. Data from IDEA 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter Turnout Switzerland, 
above n 234. 
242 Figures are based on YAP. Voter turn out based on registered voters: 78.2 per cent in 
1992, 63.4 per cent in 1996, 67.4 per cent in 2000. Data from LDEA International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter Turnout United States Presidential Election, 
above n 234. 
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cent in 1992, 43.9 per cent in 1996, 44.0 per cent in 2000 VAP.243 Between 
1990 and 2000 the Californian people voted on 72 referenda.244 
4 Indications from the figures 
The New Zealand figures show a rise in voter turnout through out the 
first years of experience New Zealanders made with the CIR Act. This trend 
was reversed on a general election that followed after it became clear that the 
New Zealand Government would not act according to the result of the first 
referendum. The decline continued during the two referenda 1999. The 
government did not act according to their results either. This trend could 
indicate that the governmental response to a referendum has more effect on 
voter turnout that the actual introduction of a citizens initiated referendum was 
able to generate. But if a binding effect would be the dominant factor to 
influence participation, voter turnout in nations with binding referenda should 
have risen or at least kept steady. This was not the case. The figures from all 
other examples with non-compulsory voting show a constant decline, too. But 
a comparison between Canada with only one recent referendum and the direct 
democracy capitols Switzerland and California show a large difference in the 
level of decline: while Switzerland and California many referenda have a 
voter turnout below 50 or even 40 per cent, the voter turnout in Canada is 
despite its decline above 64 per cent. Excluding the consideration of other 
factors, this indicates that the possibility to participate by referenda has a 
positive effect on participation in the long term. Factors that negatively 
counter-effect this benefit are governmental non-compliance and a referenda 
overload. 
IV CONCLUSION 
New Zealand's experience with non-binding, indicative citizens 
initiative referenda is that government has not acted upon the results of three 
referenda. A dominant aspect about the introduction of the CIR Act was the 
243 Center for Voting and Democracy, American Elections <www.fairvote.org> (last accessed 
14 December 2004). 
H
4 !RI Initiative & Referendum Institute: State wide initiatives - California 
<www.iandrinstitute.com> (la ·t accessed 14 December 2004) . 
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intention to enhance participation. The CIR Act seemed to have had the 
intended effect for participation measured in a voter turnout in general 
elections rose. This trend was reversed, when government did not act upon the 
first result. Support for the beneficial effect of participation by referendum can 
be drawn from the fact that, despite the same tendency of voter turnout 
decline in other jurisdictions, the use of binding referenda throughout the 
world is increasing instead of decreasing. In contrast, declining voter turnout 
is also found in the United Kingdom, where no national referenda were held 
in the recent past. No jurisdiction with binding referenda has abandoned them. 
The theoretical bases for the attempt to increase participation is 
legitimacy of government. While a decision is considered 'more' legitimate, 
because it can be traced directly to the will of the people, the intermediate 
steps in a referendum process are a significant danger to a continuous trace of 
legitimacy. Non-legitimised, third party influence can lead to an 
implementation or interpretation of the referendum result, that was not 
intended by the people. The Australian republic referendum illustrated this. 
On the bases that participation is necessary for the axiom of legitimacy, 
safeguards for the interruption of the trace of legitimacy within the process of 
reduction have to be taken. For practical reasons, this means that intermediate 
decisions should be made by representatives and supported by the benefits of 
the representative system, such as deliberation in parliament. 
The New Zealand experience has shown that people are most 
interested to take action in issues of constitutional nature. Overseas experience 
seems to support this trend. In all other jurisdictions considered, the 
possibility to participate in constitutional changes by referendum are found. 
Only in Canada, this form is not binding in nature. But as much as other 
jurisdictions allow for participation in fundamental matters constituting their 
societies, there are also equivalent safeguards present. They are formal (draft, 
proposal) or material (federal system, power to declare invalid) in nature. 
The interpretation of the voter turnout results and the continuous 
development overseas suggest, that if ew Zealand chooses to use referenda 
as an democratic element to effectively enhance participation, the adoption of 
a binding model is preferable. The interest of New Zealanders according to 
the participation exercised in connection with the CIR Act suggests that a first 
step a binding model should focus on, are constitutional matters. Safeguards 
of a federal system or a supreme constitution are not found in New Zealand. 
Overseas experience shows that other jurisdictions have not extended the 
range of participation to the initiative about constitutional matters. Only in 
Switzerland, people can initiate a constitutional revision, but cannot make 
specific suggestions. In order to implement similar safeguards, to secure the 
intended effect of participation - legitimacy - and to use the benefits of the 
representative system, the participation of the people should be limited to the 
last decision. A gentle step to enhance the CIR would be to leave the process 
of reduction in the hands of the representatives for the aim of keeping a 
coherent trace of legitimacy. In consequence, without a written constitution is 
should be Parliaments authority to define the matters of constitutional nature. 
A further definition by for example a specified catalogue of such issues which 
the people could approve by vote, could be a further step. Until such, a 
binding but government initiated referendum on constitutional matters seems 
to be the preferable step towards further development of the CIR Act. 
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